Commonwealth v. Butler, 985 N.E.2d 377

1991: criminal complaint and arrest warrant issued for rape and unarmed burglary.
1998: charges on the 1991 complaint dismissed without prejudice due to victim unavailability.
1999: Commonwealth reindicted on aggravated rape and unarmed burglary arising from the same conduct.
1999–2003: lengthy delay between indictment and trial; defendant ultimately convicted of rape (lesser included) and acquitted on burglary.
Central issue: whether the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated and, if so, whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising it on direct appeal.
Mass. art. 11 analysis centers on when the speedy trial clock attaches and whether it resumes after dismissal and reinstatement of charges.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does art. 11 speedy trial attach?	Commonwealth contends attachment occurs at formal charging event.	Butler contends attachment timing is unsettled and may differ by pleading type.	Attachment attaches when a criminal complaint issues.
Does the speedy trial clock resume after dismissal and reinstatement of charges?	Time prior to dismissal should count toward the clock.	Time after dismissal should be treated as reset.	Clock resumes after reinstatement; time before dismissal counts.
Do Barker factors show a constitutional speedy-trial violation given the ten-year delay?	Prolonged delay favors the defense; presumptive prejudice exists.	Delay was largely offset by justifications and defense acquiescence.	No constitutional speedy-trial violation after weighing Barker factors.
Was appellate counsel ineffective for not raising a constitutional speedy-trial claim on direct appeal?	Counsel should have argued the constitutional claim.	Strategic decision to forego constitutional claim was reasonable.	Counsel's performance was not ineffective; Saferian standard satisfied.

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (U.S. 1992) (presumptive prejudice required for Barker analysis; delays part of the Barker framework)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four-factor speedy-trial test (length, reason, defendant's assertion, prejudice))
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1971) (speedy-trial right attaches upon arrest or formal charge; timing reflects initiation of prosecution)
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1982) (procedure for time counting after dismissal and reinstatement; supports resume view)
Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893 (Mass. 1980) (applies Barker framework; defendant's assertion of right matters for prejudice)
Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 Mass. 351 (Mass. 1974) (prejudice and delay analysis under state fast-speedy-trial standards)
Commonwealth v. Willis, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 963 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (negligence in delays weighed against Commonwealth but not heavily)
Burton v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1008 (Mass. 2000) (predecessor on whether dismissal in good faith tolls speedy-trial time)
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (Mass. 1974) (standard for ineffective-assistance analysis in Massachusetts)