Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247

Background

Appellant killed Dale Steven Henry by driving his pickup head‑on into him near a bar in Fulton County, PA, on May 31, 2010 after a night of drinking and a confrontation outside Hillside Tavern.
Appellant had prior DUI and minor offenses, but no substantial history of violence; he admitted drinking about six beers that day.
Henry was heavily intoxicated (.18% BAC) and was involved in an earlier bar altercation but did not threaten Appellant directly.
The truck speed at impact was about 17 mph; the collision caused fatal blunt‑force trauma to Henry; there is no evidence Henry attacked Appellant in the moment of impact.
The trial court found the deadly weapon enhancement applied to Appellant’s third‑degree murder conviction based on the vehicle; Appellant was sentenced to 15 to 40 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, the en banc court affirmed, rejecting most of Appellant’s IAC and challenge arguments and concluding the vehicle is a deadly weapon for purposes of the DWE.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court properly charged causation and whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting.	Buterbaugh argues causation instructions or lack thereof affected guilt.	Commonwealth contends causation was straightforward and no instruction beyond the first subdivision was required.	Causation instructions not required beyond the first subdivision; no reversible error.
Whether the malice and voluntary manslaughter charges were properly instructed; and whether counsel was ineffective for objections.	Appellant claims malice emphasis and omission of reducing circumstances misled the jury.	Court's charge balanced law and facts; voluntary manslaughter lacked evidentiary support.	Malice instruction proper; voluntary manslaughter instruction not warranted given record.
Whether evidence of victim’s character via Henry’s prior convictions was admissible and counsel ineffective for its handling.	Defense sought to show Henry’s violent character; evidence admitted as prior crimes.	Amos framework allows victim‑character evidence in self‑defense cases; here misadventure dispels that.	Amos limits apply; evidence admissible only with proper theory; trial strategy not ineffective.
Whether the deadly weapon enhancement applied to the vehicle (motor vehicle) based on § 303.10(a)(2)(iii) as an instrumentality.	Vehicle should be treated as instrumentality under DWE given use to cause death.	Burns previously suggested vehicles were not generally weapons; but Burns relied on strict construction plus later clarifications.	Automobile qualifies as a deadly weapon under DWE when used to cause death; enhancement affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Burns, 390 Pa. Super. 426, 568 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. 1990) (motor vehicles generally not weapons; Burns limited to its facts but later reconsidered in context of DWE)
Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 301 A.2d 837 (Pa. 1973) (legal vs. proximate cause; defines direct cause as direct and substantial factor)
Commonwealth v. Skufca, 222 Pa. Super. 506, 294 A.2d 787 (Pa. Super. 1972) (causation/factor in multi-cause scenarios)
Commonwealth v. Nunn, Pa. Super. 3d 947 A.2d 756 (Pa. Super. 2008) (two‑part causation test for criminal causation)
Commonwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa. 297, 284 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1971) (victim’s character evidence admissible to prove self‑defense knowledge of victim’s tendencies)
Commonwealth v. Evans, 343 Pa. Super. 118, 494 A.2d 383 (Pa. Super. 1985) (chain of causation and aggravated death cases)
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 A.2d 801 (Pa. Super. 2003) (furnishing alcohol to minors as chain of causation)
Commonwealth v. Raybuck, 915 A.2d 125 (Pa. Super. 2006) (intact glass bottle as deadly weapon under DWE)
Commonwealth v. Chapmen, 365 Pa. Super. 10, 528 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. 1987) (deadly weapon concept in DWE)