Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516

Defendant was on probation when police received reports (Dec. 2011) alleging he committed sexual offenses against two relatives (an adult with Asperger’s and a minor). Criminal charges and a probable-cause finding for probation violation followed.
Civilian witnesses (the two alleged victims) failed to appear at the initial hearing despite being summonsed; the probation hearing was continued and later held with only hearsay testimony from two police officers who had interviewed the victims.
The judge found all live testimony was hearsay but concluded the victims’ independent accounts corroborated each other, making the hearsay substantially reliable; the judge revoked probation and sentenced the defendant to a short jail term with the balance suspended.
Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the hearsay was not sufficiently reliable to support revocation, (2) the judge failed to make a separate Rule 6(b) “good cause” finding before proceeding without live percipient witnesses, and (3) the district attorney’s office improperly interfered with the probation department in violation of art. 30 (separation of powers).
The trial judge relied on the corroboration and Patton factors to assess reliability and stated that separate good-cause proof was unnecessary under current SJC precedent; he excluded speculative testimony about victim/witness advocate communications.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether hearsay-only evidence met due process to support probation revocation	Hearsay was reliable and sufficient when it bore indicia of trustworthiness	Hearsay was unreliable (victim with Asperger’s; possible copying by child) and thus insufficient	Held: Hearsay was substantially reliable (independent corroboration, contemporaneous accounts, differing language); revocation affirmed
Whether Rule 6(b) requires a separate “good cause” finding distinct from hearsay reliability	Rule 6(b) text requires two-pronged finding: reliability and separate good cause	Rule 6(b) should not exceed constitutional due process requirements; reliability can satisfy good cause	Held: Under SJC precedent, reliability itself satisfies the good-cause requirement; Rule 6(b) should be conformed to that law
Whether prosecutor office interfered with probation officer (art. 30) by victim/witness communications	N/A (claim asserted by defendant)	DA’s office merely cooperated; no record of deliberate interference; probation summoned witnesses	Held: No evidence of improper interference; claim rejected
Whether defendant’s failure to seek a continuance or probe witness-contact statements forfeited complaint	N/A	Defendant did not request continuance or develop record about victim/witness advocate statements	Held: Defendant did not pursue or preserve the issue at trial; court declined to speculate; no reversible error

Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process framework for probation/parole revocation)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (additional procedural protections for revocation hearings)
Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108 (1990) (unreliable hearsay cannot alone support revocation; reliability can)
Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193 (1993) (discussing hearsay sufficiency in revocation context)
Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 685 (2004) (holding reliable hearsay satisfies good-cause requirement)
Commonwealth v. Nunez, 446 Mass. 54 (2006) (hearsay reliability and burden of proof in revocation)
Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119 (2010) (articulating factors to assess hearsay reliability)
Commonwealth v. Janovich, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 42 (2002) (trial judge’s province to weigh evidence)