Commonwealth v. Buford, 101 A.3d 1182

Background

Buford was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), and violating the Uniform Firearms Act; sentences were life for murder and shorter terms for PIC and VUFA, all concurrent.
Evidence showed Palmer was killed by multiple gunshots in an alley in Philadelphia on Sept. 18, 2010; no shell casings were recovered, but bullets and wound patterns suggested revolver-type ammunition.
Witnesses included Henderson (unavailable at trial), Jackson and Smith who gave statements identifying Buford as the shooter, and medical examiner evidence linking gunshot wounds to death.
Henderson’s preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at trial under hearsay and availability-based exceptions, including identification tied to Buford as “Flip.”
Detective Bamberski testified about Henderson’s demeanor and fear, with courts instructing jurors to disregard hearsay aspects; trial court admitted other portions.
The defense challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the voir dire proceedings, and several evidentiary rulings, all of which the Superior Court upheld on appeal.
The court affirmed Buford’s judgments of sentence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the evidence sufficient to sustain first-degree murder?	Buford contends insufficient evidence of identity and intent beyond a reasonable doubt.	Buford argues lack of proof of shooter identity and lack of specific intent.	Yes; sufficient evidence supported guilt for first-degree murder, PIC, and VUFA.
Did Buford’s absence from in-camera voir dire of juror No. 7 violate his right to be present?	Buford’s presence during voir dire was necessary for fairness.	Counsel could assess jurors; presence not required for sidebar discussions.	No; presence not required where counsel attended and defendant’s right to participate was respected.
Was Henderson’s preliminary hearing testimony properly admitted as substantive evidence?	Buford argues admission violated confrontation rights and reliability.	Testimony was admissible under established exceptions given unavailability and cross-examination.	Yes; admissible under Brady/Lively framework given cross-examination and reliability.
Was it proper to admit Dr. Lieberman’s autopsy-related testimony without Dr. Hunt’s live testimony?	Lieberman’s testimony was hearsay and denied confrontation.	Lieberman independently reviewed records and provided qualified expert testimony.	Yes; permissible as a qualified expert reflecting independent review and correction of Hunt’s report.
Were Jackson’s and Smith’s prior statements admissible as substantive evidence?	Prior statements inconsistent with trial testimony should be excluded as hearsay.	Under Pa.R.E. 803.1(1), prior inconsistent statements admitted if properly recorded and cross-examined.	Yes; properly admitted as substantive evidence because statements were written/adopted and cross-examined.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. 2005) (sufficiency review and circumstantial evidence acceptable to prove elements)
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 827 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2003) (specific intent to kill may be inferred from weapon use)
Commonwealth v. Woodbury, 477 A.2d 890 (Pa. Super. 1984) (possessing instrument of crime sustained by circumstantial evidence)
Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 614 A.2d 684 (Pa. 1992) (requirements for admissibility of prior statements under hearsay rule)
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 648 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1994) (full and fair cross-examination required for admissibility of prior statements)
Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66 (Pa. 1986) (foundational rule for admissibility of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence)
Commonwealth v. Lively, 464 A.2d 7 (Pa. 1992) (admissibility framework for prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence)
Commonwealth v. Ellison, 902 A.2d 419 (Pa. 2006) (voir dire rights and defendant presence at trial stages)