Commonwealth v. Brown
466 Mass. 1007
| Mass. | 2013Background
- Michael R. Brown was convicted by a jury of unlawful prescribing/distributing controlled substances (G. L. c. 94C §§ 32A(a), 32B(a)), submitting false medical claims (G. L. c. 118E § 40(2)), and larceny over $250 (G. L. c. 266 § 30(1)); convictions were affirmed in Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708 (2010) (Brown I).
- After denial of rehearing, Brown filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies; he then moved for relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 in Superior Court, which denied the motion without a hearing; Brown appealed to this court.
- The central legal dispute concerns whether a physician who issues prescriptions for no legitimate medical purpose to patients seeking drugs for illicit use may be convicted of "distributing" (rather than merely "dispensing") controlled substances under G. L. c. 94C.
- In Brown I this court analyzed the Controlled Substances Act, concluding that a physician who issues prescriptions for no legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of professional practice can be prosecuted for unlawful distribution under G. L. c. 94C §§ 32–32H.
- At trial the Commonwealth proceeded (and the jury was instructed) using the term "dispense," but the judge’s elements matched unlawful distribution; this court concluded the jury effectively convicted Brown of distribution despite the use of the word "dispense."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury’s instruction treating "dispense" as controlling but using distribution elements precludes distribution conviction | Brown: judge’s instruction using "dispense" acquitted him of distribution; court later converting to distribution violates double jeopardy | Commonwealth: wording notwithstanding, the elements submitted matched unlawful distribution; no acquittal occurred | Court: No double jeopardy violation; jury effectively convicted distribution despite term used at trial |
| Whether Commonwealth’s election to proceed on dispensing was equivalent to nolle prosequi or directed verdict extinguishing distribution charge | Brown: Commonwealth’s election removed distribution from contention, depriving him of appeal rights | Commonwealth: Substantive issues and evidence concerned distribution; no functional dismissal occurred | Court: Argument fails; distribution remained effectively at issue and Brown identified no different appellate strategy he would have used |
| Whether appellate decision converting to distribution violated due process/ex post facto/equal protection | Brown: conversion retroactively changed nature of offense and process | Commonwealth: statutory interpretation of Act justified conclusion; no retroactive or discriminatory application | Court: Claims fail for same reason as above; no constitutional violation found |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to alleged acquittal of distribution | Brown: counsel ineffective because distribution was "no longer in contention" and thus not defended | Commonwealth: Claim not adequately developed and not a proper ineffective-assistance argument | Court: Claim insufficiently argued and substantively misplaced; rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708 (2010) (analyzing Controlled Substances Act and holding physician can be prosecuted for unlawful distribution when prescribing for no legitimate medical purpose)