Commonwealth v. Brooks, 66 A.3d 352

Brooks was convicted by jury of multiple counts including attempts to commit homicide and aggravated assault, with a separate firearm-related conviction; sentence 42 to 84 years runs consecutive to a federal term.
In December 2006, police encountered a prowler in Radnor; shots were fired at officers; Brooks was later linked to other incidents through ensuing investigations.
In July 2007, Brooks engaged in a high-speed chase after running a red light; a handgun, cell phone, and mask were found in his vehicle following a subsequent search.
Before trial, Brooks sought to proceed pro se but only if granted a continuance to prepare; the court denied the continuance after a lengthy dialogue with Brooks and counsel.
During trial, the Commonwealth introduced cell phone records and corroborating testimony linking Brooks to a December 6, 2006 call; Cardona testified to Brooks’s ownership of the phone and prior conviction as straw purchaser.
Brooks chose not to testify; the court indicated it would permit admission of prior-conviction evidence if he testified; Brooks ultimately did not testify.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denial of a continuance to prepare pro se defense violated Faretta	Brooks argues denial impaired Faretta rights.	Brooks contends continuance was necessary to exercise self-representation.	Remanded for new trial due to Faretta violation; automatic reversal.
Whether denial of the continuance improperly delayed proceedings	Delays were not improper delays by Brooks.	Court abused discretion by delaying trial to force counsel participation.	Not separately addressed after ruling on Faretta issue; reversal based on Faretta.
Whether admission of prior-conviction evidence if Brooks testified was error	Brooks’s testimony would have opened the door to prior convictions.	Evidence would be admissible if Brooks testified.	Not decided due to reversal on Faretta issue; issues not reached.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. Supreme Court 1975) (right to self-representation requires unequivocal, timely waiver)
Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1995) (Faretta waiver must be knowing and on the record)
Commonwealth v. McDonough, 812 A.2d 504 (Pa. 2002) (Faretta colloquy required)
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (timeliness of pro se request and waiver must be on record)
Commonwealth v. El, 977 A.2d 1158 (Pa. 2009) (federal-law-inspired approach to Faretta issues)
Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1985) (linked continuance and Faretta requests; continuance may be required to preserve rights)
Barham v. Powell, 895 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1990) (continued potential for delay; limits on after initial continuance)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1999) (some constitutional errors are subject to automatic reversal)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (U.S. Supreme Court 1984) (limits and protections for Faretta proceedings and representation)
Davido v. Commonwealth, 868 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2005) (timeliness and purposes of pro se requests in Pennsylvania)