Commonwealth v. Britton
134 A.3d 83
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- Raymond Britton pleaded guilty in 1989 to first‑degree rape and kidnapping and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 9–25 years.
- Megan’s Law/SORNA registration requirements were not in effect at his plea but were enacted later; SORNA (42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10–9799.41) became effective December 20, 2012.
- Britton was residing at a state halfway house and signed out on September 29, 2013, but did not return; police charged him with failing to register a change of residence on October 4, 2013, after his arrest in Dauphin County.
- At a bench trial the parties submitted a stipulation of facts; the trial court convicted Britton under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1 for failure to comply with registration requirements and sentenced him to 40–80 months’ imprisonment.
- Britton appealed, raising (1) insufficiency of the evidence regarding the three‑business‑day reporting requirement, (2) that retroactive application of SORNA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, and (3) that retroactive application denied his right to counsel (or otherwise was punitive).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Britton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: whether Commonwealth proved three business days elapsed before arrest | Stipulated facts (leave on Sept 29, arrest Oct 4) satisfy the reporting-time requirement when judicially noticing calendar days | Three business days were not proved; trial court impermissibly looked beyond the record to determine weekdays | Court upheld conviction: calendar days were judicially notice‑able and stipulation shows reporting window expired before arrest |
| Ex Post Facto: whether retroactive application of SORNA is punitive and barred | Legislature stated SORNA is nonpunitive; precedent applies Smith two‑step test and Mendoza‑Martinez factors to find nonpunitive effect | SORNA’s effects are punitive under Mendoza‑Martinez and thus retroactive application violates Ex Post Facto Clause | Court rejected Britton’s claim, following Perez: SORNA is nonpunitive in intent and effect; retroactive application does not violate federal Ex Post Facto Clause |
| Right to counsel / punishment characterization: whether SORNA’s application converted plea consequences into punishment denying counsel | Registration is collateral consequence, not part of criminal punishment; prior cases treat registration as nonpunitive | Retroactive registration is punitive and undermined Britton’s right to counsel at his 1989 plea | Court declined relief: registration is collateral consequence; prior precedent (McDonough) forecloses recharacterizing SORNA as punishment |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (test for whether a statute is punitive for ex post facto purposes)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (multi‑factor test for determining whether a statute’s effects are punitive)
- Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. holding SORNA nonpunitive under Smith/Mendoza‑Martinez)
- Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067 (registration is a collateral consequence, not criminal punishment)
- Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254 (standard of review for legal questions)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 839 A.2d 433 (judicial notice principles)