Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551

Police executed a search warrant at the defendant’s Williams College dorm room on Nov. 8, 2010, seizing marijuana; the room was ~700 feet from a preschool.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute (G. L. c. 94C, § 32C(a)) and a school-zone sentencing enhancement (G. L. c. 94C, § 32J) based on the 1,000-foot radius then in effect.
On Aug. 2, 2012, the Legislature enacted St. 2012, c. 192 (the "Crime Bill"), which reduced the § 32J school-zone radius from 1,000 feet to 300 feet (§ 30) and otherwise limited the temporal scope (§ 31).
Defendant moved to dismiss the school-zone count, arguing § 30 should apply to all pending cases and that his alleged conduct fell outside the new 300-foot radius.
The trial judge reported the retroactivity question to the Appeals Court; the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review.
The Court framed the legal issue as whether § 30 applies to offenses that occurred before Aug. 2, 2012, but where no guilty plea had been accepted or conviction entered by that date.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether St. 2012, c. 192, § 30 (reducing school-zone radius from 1,000 ft to 300 ft) applies to cases not adjudicated by Aug. 2, 2012	The Commonwealth: statute presumptively prospective unless clear legislative intent or repugnancy to statutory context; no clear retroactivity language so prospective only	Defendant: § 30 should apply to all pending, non-adjudicated cases on Aug. 2, 2012, because the amendment reduces an overbroad sentencing enhancement and should not prolong disparate impact	Held: Yes. § 30 applies to all cases where no guilty plea was accepted or conviction entered as of Aug. 2, 2012, even if the offense occurred earlier — retroactive application justified because prospective application would be "repugnant to the context" by perpetuating proven disparate impact on urban/minority communities.

Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96 (2012) (presumption that penal statutes apply prospectively; interpretation of G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second)
Nassar v. Commonwealth, 341 Mass. 584 (1961) (amendments inconsistent with earlier provisions may effect implicit repeal)
Patrick v. Commissioner of Correction, 352 Mass. 666 (1967) (punishment is "incurred" when the offense is committed)
Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647 (1992) (§ 32J is a location-based sentencing enhancement; no mens rea for being in a school zone)
Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 462 Mass. 370 (2012) (emergency preambles show intent to expedite effective date but do not alone demonstrate retroactive intent)
Federal Nat’l Mtge. Ass’n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511 (2011) (similar caution on inferring retroactivity from emergency preambles)
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (Fair Sentencing Act applied to offenders not yet sentenced; legislative changes reducing sentencing disparities can be applied retroactively to avoid perpetuating unfairness)