129 N.E.3d 847
Mass.2019Background
- In 2009 Bonnett was convicted of first‑degree murder for the shooting death of Vincent Gaskins based on testimony (Sheffery Johnson), a confession to Joseph Burns, and forensic evidence (palm print and DNA on a recovered .22 firearm).
- Pretrial the defense received a redacted FBI report referencing a "cooperating witness" who reported a rumor that Brandon Payne shot the victim and that Bonnett disposed of the gun; the trial court denied a motion to compel the informant’s identity because the federal investigation was ongoing.
- On direct appeal (Bonnett I) the Supreme Judicial Court found the pretrial informant‑identity motion had not been properly appraised and remanded for a Roviaro analysis; the informant’s identity (Victor Bizzell) and an unredacted FBI report were later disclosed.
- After disclosure, Bonnett moved for a new trial based on newly available evidence: testimony from Bizzell and two others alleging inculpatory statements by the now‑deceased Payne that he (Payne) had taken credit for the killing or had told others he had done it.
- At an evidentiary hearing the motion judge found the three new witnesses not credible (motive to help Bonnett, inconsistent statements, poor demeanor) and concluded the new evidence was not material or sufficiently credible to cast real doubt on the conviction.
- The SJC affirmed, deferring to the motion judge’s credibility findings and declining to exercise extraordinary §33E relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Bonnett) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether newly available evidence (Bizzell, Brown, Edwards) warrants a new trial | The new testimony is unpersuasive and, even if credited, does not undermine the strong trial evidence (confession, eyewitness, forensic matches) | The newly disclosed statements implicating Payne as shooter are material, credible, and would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations | Denied — judge did not abuse discretion; new evidence not sufficiently credible or material to cast real doubt |
| Whether the motion judge abused discretion by assessing witness credibility at the new‑trial hearing | Credibility determinations at a new‑trial hearing are proper and entitled to deference | Court erred by evaluating credibility instead of treating the proffered evidence as presumptively admissible | Rejected — assessing credibility at the new‑trial stage is appropriate and within the judge’s discretion |
| Whether the Roviaro informant‑identity issue required further relief after disclosure | No further relief needed because informant identity was disclosed on remand and any resultant evidence did not warrant a new trial | Denial of informant identity pretrial deprived Bonnett of material evidence and required new trial | Roviaro issue rendered moot by disclosure; defendant could pursue new‑trial motion on newly available evidence, which failed |
| Whether this Court should invoke extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E | No — record does not justify reduction of verdict or new trial | Yes — grant new trial or reduce verdict based on cumulative record/new evidence | Denied — no basis to exercise §33E authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (framework for informant disclosure balancing public interest and defendant’s need)
- Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827 (remand for Roviaro analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303 (standard for new trial based on newly discovered evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340 (application of new‑evidence/newly‑available standard)
- Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479 (deference to motion judge on credibility at new‑trial hearing)
- Commonwealth v. Weichell, 446 Mass. 785 (admissibility and corroboration of statements against penal interest)