Commonwealth v. Blango
150 A.3d 45
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- On August 28, 2014, Tyler J. Blango entered an open guilty plea to third-degree murder, related firearms offenses, and conspiracy, in connection with a multi-defendant shooting at Tustin Playground that killed a spectator.
- As part of the plea, Blango agreed to cooperate and testify truthfully against co-defendants (including trials of Postell and Jordan) and to provide information about an unrelated defendant (Glenn Long).
- Blango testified against co-defendants at earlier trials but later recanted his statement implicating Glenn Long at Long’s April 9, 2015 trial and threatened Long after leaving the stand.
- The Commonwealth responded to Blango’s recantation by seeking a much harsher sentence (35–70 years). One day after that response, Blango filed a pre-sentence motion (May 15, 2015) to withdraw his guilty plea.
- The trial court denied the motion on June 12, 2015, concluding Blango’s claimed innocence was implausible, the Commonwealth had been prejudiced (Blango had previewed the Commonwealth’s case and co-defendants had since been tried/convicted), and Blango had breached the cooperation agreement; the Superior Court affirmed the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Blango) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth/Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in denying pre‑sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea | Blango asserted actual innocence and argued the Commonwealth breached the cooperation agreement (questioned him without counsel contrary to an oral agreement) | Commonwealth and trial court argued Blango’s innocence claim was implausible, he breached the cooperation agreement by recanting and threatening Long, and withdrawal would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth | Denial affirmed — no abuse of discretion |
| Whether withdrawal would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth | Blango: Commonwealth bears burden of proof; cannot show prejudice | Commonwealth: Blango previewed the entire case by testifying; co-defendants were tried/convicted or sentenced; withdrawal would amount to extrajudicial severance and require re-litigating witnesses whose status changed | Trial court properly found substantial prejudice; withdrawal denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015) (pre‑sentence plea withdrawal standard: liberally granted for any fair-and-just reason unless Commonwealth substantially prejudiced; innocence must be plausible)
- Commonwealth v. Kirsch, 930 A.2d 1282 (Pa. Super. 2007) (prejudice requires showing Commonwealth is worse off due to events after plea such that returning to pretrial stage is inequitable)
- Commonwealth v. Tennison, 969 A.2d 572 (Pa. Super. 2009) (claim of innocence not fair-and-just when motivated by desire to manipulate the system)
- Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 832 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 2003) (undeveloped/unsupported arguments are waived)
- Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337 (Pa. Super. 2014) (post‑sentence plea withdrawal standard: manifest injustice required)
- Commonwealth v. Campbell, 455 A.2d 126 (Pa. Super. 1983) (prejudice may be shown where prosecution substantially relies on the plea to its detriment)