Commonwealth v. Bell
167 A.3d 744
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- On May 16, 2015 police stopped Thomas S. Bell for a taillight defect, observed signs of intoxication, and arrested him for DUI after a .127% breath test.
- Bell was transported for a hospital blood draw, was read Pennsylvania DL-26 chemical testing warnings, and refused the blood test.
- Bell was charged with DUI (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1)) and a summary lighting offense; at bench trial the Commonwealth introduced testimony that Bell refused blood testing.
- Bell was convicted; he moved for reconsideration relying on Birchfield (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2016), arguing admission of his refusal penalized a constitutional right.
- The trial court granted a new trial, excluding evidence of refusal; the Commonwealth appealed before sentencing.
- The Superior Court reversed, holding Pennsylvania’s implied-consent evidentiary consequence (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(e)) is constitutionally permissible and that Birchfield does not create a constitutional right to refuse warrantless blood testing that bars admission of refusal evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of refusal evidence under Implied Consent Law at DUI trial | Commonwealth: evidence of refusal is admissible to show consciousness of guilt under §1547(e). | Bell: admission penalizes his Fourth Amendment right to refuse warrantless blood search (relying on Birchfield). | Court held admissible: motorists can be deemed to have consented to civil/evidentiary consequences under implied-consent scheme; Birchfield does not bar §1547(e). |
| Whether Birchfield created a constitutional right to refuse warrantless blood tests | Bell: Birchfield protects refusal from being used as evidence. | Commonwealth: Birchfield permits civil penalties and evidentiary consequences; it only prohibits criminal penalties for refusal. | Court held Birchfield does not create a constitutional right to refuse blood testing for purposes of excluding refusal evidence. |
| Whether admission of refusal evidence is equivalent to penalizing exercise of Fourth/Fifth Amendment rights | Bell: Admission punishes constitutional right and requires new trial. | Commonwealth: refusal is not a constitutional privilege; implied-consent consequences are statutory and permissible. | Court held no constitutional violation; Neville/Graham support admission and the legislature may condition license privilege on submission to testing. |
| Whether search-incident-to-arrest justifies warrantless blood tests | N/A at trial stage (Bell refused). | Commonwealth previously argued search-incident-to-arrest may support breath but not blood; not determinative here. | Court noted Birchfield rejects search-incident-to-arrest for blood but sustains implied-consent evidentiary consequences. |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016) (held breath tests may be search-incident-to-arrest but blood tests are more intrusive; criminalizing refusal is unconstitutional while civil/evidentiary consequences may be permissible)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (admission of refusal of warrantless blood test does not violate Fifth Amendment or due process)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (compelled blood test produces physical, non-testimonial evidence not protected by Fifth Amendment)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) (plurality) (rejects automatic blood-draw exception; emphasizes need to assess exigency facts)
- Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibits comment to jury that a defendant's silence implies guilt — discussed as a distinct protection from impeachment by refusal)
- Commonwealth v. Graham, 703 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. 1997) (held no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing; evidentiary consequences under §1547(e) are permissible)