Commonwealth v. Barnes
167 A.3d 110
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- On Dec. 19, 2010 Barnes (defendant) strangled his ex-girlfriend, rendered her unconscious twice, and left her wrapped in a blanket in a dumpster; she suffered serious neck and facial injuries. Barnes was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault (serious bodily injury), kidnapping, REAP, terroristic threats, and theft.
- A jury convicted Barnes of attempted murder, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and REAP; acquitted him of terroristic threats. He was originally sentenced to aggregate 25–50 years (20–40 for attempted murder; consecutive shorter terms for other counts).
- This Court (panel) in 2013 vacated the judgment and remanded, holding aggravated assault and attempted homicide merged for sentencing because they arose from the same facts (choking to unconsciousness).
- On remand the trial court resentenced Barnes to the same aggregate term (25–50 years) by increasing the kidnapping term so the total remained unchanged; Barnes appealed the resentencing.
- Barnes raised: (1) Apprendi challenge — the 40-year attempted murder maximum required a jury finding of serious bodily injury; (2) vindictiveness/substantial question — resentencing increased a component sentence after appellate victory and lacked on-the-record reasons.
Issues
| Issue | Barnes' Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Apprendi required a jury finding of serious bodily injury before imposing 40-yr max for attempted murder | Barnes: Section 1102(c) makes 40-yr cap contingent on "serious bodily injury," which is an element that must be found by a jury under Apprendi | Commonwealth: Jury found serious bodily injury on aggravated assault count, which suffices to support 40-yr exposure | Court: Vacated 40-yr attempted-murder sentence; under Apprendi the jury must have been presented and have found serious bodily injury as to attempted murder — aggravated assault finding cannot be imputed to attempted murder. |
| Whether law-of-the-case from 2013 panel bars relitigation of whether jury found serious bodily injury for attempted murder | Barnes: (implicit) prior panel decided only merger, not the SBI finding issue | Commonwealth: 2013 panel’s ruling precludes reconsideration | Court: Law-of-the-case did not decide the Apprendi/SBI question; prior panel only addressed merger, so issue may be evaluated now. |
| Whether resentencing produced judicial vindictiveness (kidnapping term increased) | Barnes: Increased kidnapping term after successful appeal presumes vindictiveness; lack of record reasons supports presumption | Commonwealth: Aggregate sentence unchanged; trial court preserved original sentencing scheme and thus no vindictiveness | Court: No vindictiveness — preserving aggregate sentence is a legitimate objective; increased component sentence permissible when aggregate unchanged. |
| Whether trial court failed to state reasons on record at resentencing | Barnes: Sentencing lacked on-the-record, reasoned statement | Commonwealth: Resentencing preserved scheme so record sufficient | Court: Because Apprendi error requires vacatur of attempted-murder sentence, court remanded for resentencing; court reminded trial judge to state reasons on the record when resentencing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (any fact that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 A.2d 60 (Pa. Super. 2006) (Section 1102(c) requires jury finding of serious bodily injury before 40-year attempted-murder maximum may be imposed)
- Commonwealth v. Reid, 867 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super. 2005) (serious bodily injury is a fact that must be proven for enhanced attempted-murder exposure; plea/factual admissions can give notice)
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969) (due process prohibits vindictiveness in resentencing; increased sentence after retrial requires objective, record-supported reasons)
- Commonwealth v. Walker, 568 A.2d 201 (Pa. Super. 1989) (trial court may preserve original sentencing scheme on resentencing; Pearce concerns apply to resentencing contexts)