Commonwealth v. Barndt
74 A.3d 185
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2013Background
- Appellant Michael Barndt, on parole, pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine after plea negotiations that sought to avoid a mandatory minimum sentence; plea resulted in an agreed sentence of 48–96 months.
- At arrest the Parole Board issued a detainer; prosecutor Michelle Kluk sought confirmation about how much "street time" (parole credit) Appellant would lose and communicated with the parole officer; she told defense counsel she was "satisfied that [Appellant] will lose most or all of his street time" but could not guarantee the exact amount and referenced an estimated 11-month loss.
- Defense counsel Philip Lauer conveyed to Appellant that he expected an ~11-month setback; Appellant relied on that representation as a principal factor in accepting the plea. Appellant did not see the prosecutor's letter until after sentencing.
- The Parole Board later revoked Appellant's parole and imposed a recommitment of ~1,225 days (~41 months), far exceeding the 11-month estimate. Appellant moved to withdraw his plea and later filed a PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel for providing erroneous assurances about parole consequences.
- The trial court denied PCRA relief; the Superior Court reversed, holding counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by affirmatively misadvising Appellant about the magnitude of the parole setback and that Appellant was prejudiced because he would likely not have pled guilty but gone to trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Barndt) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea counsel's advice about parole setback was constitutionally deficient | Lauer affirmatively misled Barndt that he would likely lose ~11 months of street time; that error had arguable merit as counsel misapprehended/parroted non‑guaranteed info | The Parole Board consequence is collateral; Barndt knew a setback was possible and plea colloquy/written forms acknowledged parole status so counsel was not ineffective | Held for Appellant: counsel's affirmative misadvice (not mere omission) lacked a reasonable basis and constituted ineffective assistance |
| Whether Barndt suffered prejudice from counsel's misadvice | Barndt said the 11‑month setback was the most important factor in pleading; had he known the true risk he would have gone to trial | Commonwealth: written/oral colloquy and plea forms show Barndt acknowledged parole consequences and was satisfied with counsel; thus no prejudice | Held for Appellant: reasonable probability he would have gone to trial; prejudice established |
| Whether Padilla (immigration advice) controls analysis of collateral consequences | Barndt relies on Padilla to argue counsel must accurately advise on severe collateral consequences | Commonwealth and trial court treat Padilla as limited to deportation; collateral/direct distinction still generally governs | Court rejects broad Padilla expansion but holds that Padilla’s reasoning supports relief where counsel affirmatively misleads about collateral consequences |
| Remedy: withdrawal of plea available? | Barndt seeks right to withdraw plea based on ineffective assistance inducing involuntary plea | Commonwealth contends plea colloquies and acknowledgments preclude withdrawal | Held: PCRA relief granted — remand for withdrawal of plea; colloquies do not defeat claim where reliance on erroneous affirmative advice is shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes ineffective assistance standard)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice in plea context: reasonable probability defendant would not have pled if properly advised)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must give correct advice about deportation; narrows direct/collateral distinction in that context)
- Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012) (Padilla limited in Pennsylvania; collateral/direct distinction largely retained except for deportation)
- Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989) (collateral vs. direct consequence framework prior to Padilla)
- Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136 (Pa. Super. 2002) (relief where counsel affirmatively misadvised re: parole/bootstrap eligibility)
- Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365 (Pa. Super. 2006) (relief where counsel misperceived legal consequences of plea leading to loss of intended benefit)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 680 A.2d 884 (Pa. Super. 1996) (probation revocation treated as collateral consequence)