Commonwealth v. Barbour, D., Aplt.
189 A.3d 944
| Pa. | 2018Background
- Darel Barbour was scheduled for trial on October 18, 2004, but did not appear; bench warrants remained outstanding until his 2014 arrest. He moved to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 after his 2014 return, arguing the October 2004 date was untimely.
- The trial court found the Rule 600 run dates had passed before October 18, 2004, concluded the Commonwealth failed to show due diligence, and dismissed the charges with prejudice.
- The Superior Court reversed: its lead memorandum applied Commonwealth v. Steltz to hold that a defendant who voluntarily absents himself waives Rule 600 relief regardless of the original trial’s timeliness.
- Judge Bowes concurred separately, rejecting the lead’s Steltz application to an untimely trial but proposing a forfeiture theory based on prejudice from a ten-year delay in asserting the claim.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether the Steltz waiver rule applies when the originally scheduled trial was untimely under Rule 600, and (2) whether Judge Bowes’ forfeiture approach is viable given Rule 600’s text.
Issues
| Issue | Barbour’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant who fails to appear at an untimely trial waives Rule 600 relief under Steltz | Steltz waiver applies only when the defendant absents himself from a trial that was timely under Rule 600; here the trial was already untimely, so no waiver | Steltz’ rationale (system ripple effects) supports applying waiver to any voluntary absence from a trial date, timely or not | Steltz is narrow: waiver applies only where the missed trial date complied with Rule 600; an independent Rule 600 violation before the absence is not cured by the defendant’s failure to appear |
| Whether a defendant may aver in a Rule 600 motion that the initial trial date was untimely despite subsequent absconsion | Barbour: he may plead that the initial date was untimely and must be allowed to prove it; Rule 600 permits a motion “at any time before trial” | Commonwealth: requiring inquiry into timeliness invites litigation and is impractical after long delay; waiver avoids needless hearings | Court: Defendant may aver initial untimeliness and receive an opportunity to prove it; only facially timely dates with clear defendant-caused delay may be treated as waived under Steltz |
| Whether Judge Bowes’ forfeiture/prejudice theory (denying Rule 600 relief for long delay in asserting claim) is permissible under Rule 600 | Barbour: Rule 600 expressly permits a motion "at any time before trial," so imposing a separate forfeiture deadline contradicts the rule | Commonwealth: forfeiture doctrine prevents rewarding fugitives and addresses prejudice from faded memories and lost evidence | Court: Rejected Judge Bowes’ forfeiture theory as inconsistent with Rule 600’s plain text; Barbour’s October 2014 motion complied with the rule |
| Allocation of responsibility for pre-trial delay in Rule 600 computation | Barbour: delays before his absconsion were Commonwealth’s responsibility and count toward run date | Commonwealth: defendant’s absence has systemic ripple effects and should sometimes relieve the Commonwealth | Court: Causation matters — delays attributable to the defendant stop the clock; but where the Commonwealth violated Rule 600 before the defendant’s absence, the violation stands and is not cured by the defendant’s later misconduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Steltz, 560 A.2d 1390 (Pa. 1989) (holding voluntary absence from a day set for a timely trial waives Rule 600 relief)
- Commonwealth v. Brock, 61 A.3d 1015 (Pa. 2013) (applied Steltz to defendant who absconded and confirmed waiver principles apply when absconsion delays trial)
- Cohen v. Commonwealth, 392 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1978) (delays caused by defendant’s failure to appear are excludable from Rule 600 computation)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (constitutional speedy-trial framework; reason for delay is a key balancing factor)
- Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693 (Pa. 2012) (Rule 600 may provide relief even absent a constitutional Barker violation)
