Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951

Commonwealth charged Andre with arson endangering persons, arson endangering property, criminal mischief, and risking catastrophe; charges of arson endangering property and risking catastrophe were later dropped, arising from a February 9, 2008 fire in Northampton County.
Andre asserted defenses including lack of criminal responsibility due to insanity and suggested bifurcation under 50 P.S. § 7404(c); the court ordered an independent psychiatric examination.
A bifurcated trial was granted: the first jury determined whether Andre committed the act; a second jury would determine criminal responsibility if insanity was raised.
The second jury could not unanimously decide insanity, resulting in a mistrial; a jury note indicated mental illness and suicide intent but did not conclusively address knowledge of wrongfulness.
Commonwealth appealed the mistrial and related procedural rulings; the Superior Court held jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(6) and affirmed, remanding for a new trial on criminal responsibility.
The court clarified the interrelation of mens rea, insanity, and guilty but mentally ill within the bifurcated framework.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the trial court correct to not enter a guilty verdict when the first jury found guilt but the second was deadlocked on insanity?	Andre argues no final guilt without criminal responsibility.	Commonwealth contends a guilty verdict should follow from first jury.	No; a final adjudication requires criminal responsibility determined by the second jury.
Should there have been a guilty but mentally ill verdict given the first jury found guilt and the second found mental illness?	Commonwealth asserts GMBI applies based on unanimous first verdict and mental illness finding.	Andre contends no unanimous insanity verdict, so no GMBI verdict.	Not permitted; the second jury did not unanimously find legal insanity, so GMBI cannot be rendered.
Did the trial court abuse discretion by excluding evidence of the first trial's guilty verdict?	Commonwealth claims relevance to prevent confusion.	Andre argues first verdict was not a guilt verdict and evidence would mislead.	No reversible error; first verdict did not equate to guilt, and admission would mislead.
Was the verdict slip properly structured, given bifurcated proceedings and potential verdicts?	Commonwealth argues slip favored insanity-based outcomes and misstated options.	Andre asserts lack of timely objection and proper sequencing; slip harmless.	No reversible error; procedure consistent with law and Rabold/duPont guidance; harmless.

Commonwealth v. Rabold, 951 A.2d 329 (Pa. 2008) (distinguishes insanity, mental illness, and guilty but mentally ill; sequencing of issues)
Commonwealth v. duPont, 730 A.2d 970 (Pa. Super. 1999) (insanity versus other defenses; sequencing of offenses and insanity)
Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 Pa. Super. 549, 543 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. 1988) (insanity framework; four verdict options; mental illness vs insanity)
Commonwealth v. Sohmer, 519 Pa. 200, 546 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1988) (definition and interaction of mental illness and insanity; burden on insanity)
Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526, 486 A.2d 376 (Pa. 1985) (pretrial evidence concerns after mistrial; appellate timing)
Dzvonick, 450 Pa. 98, 297 A.2d 912 (Pa. 1972) (verdict structure and molding post-decision; appropriate in context)