Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183

On Aug. 10, 2012 a man was fatally shot. Eyewitnesses identified Jerome Almonor as the shooter; another witness gave Almonor's cell number and said Almonor still had the sawed-off shotgun.
Within ~6 hours police contacted the cellular service provider and requested the phone's "precise location (GPS)" via an exigent‑circumstances form; after a call the provider "pinged" the phone and returned real‑time coordinates.
Police mapped the coordinates to the general location of a street where the defendant's former girlfriend lived, went to that house, obtained consent to go upstairs, encountered the defendant, arrested him, and observed a sawed‑off shotgun and vest in plain view.
Police then obtained and executed a search warrant for the bedroom and seized the shotgun and vest; Almonor moved to suppress arguing the ping (and the evidence it produced) was the fruit of an unlawful warrantless search.
The motion judge suppressed; the SJC (applying art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights) held the ping is a search but, on these facts, the warrantless ping was justified by exigent circumstances (probable cause undisputed).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether forcing a cellphone to transmit real‑time GPS (a "ping") is a constitutionally cognizable search	Commonwealth: ping is not a search here (invokes Estabrook six‑hour rule/historical CSLI distinction)	Almonor: ping intrudes on reasonable expectation of privacy in real‑time location	Yes — under art. 14 a ping that compels real‑time location is a search
Whether the ping required a warrant in this case	Commonwealth: exigent circumstances justified warrantless ping	Almonor: no exigency; warrant required	Exigent‑circumstances exception applied — the warrantless ping was reasonable
Whether the search analysis depends on "manipulation" (property) versus privacy right to be let alone	Commonwealth emphasized nature of government conduct (ping/manipulation) to show intrusion	Concurrence: focus should be on privacy/right to be let alone, not property manipulation	Court: search parity — manipulation is one relevant feature but ultimate inquiry is reasonable expectation of privacy; concurrence emphasizes privacy/home protection
Scope of remedy and future rule for pings/warrants	Commonwealth urged existing law allowed the ping here	Almonor urged bright‑line warrant rule for all real‑time pings	Court: requires warrant ordinarily for pings; exigent circumstances may justify delay; encouraged faster remote warrant procedures in future

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (recognizing power of cell‑site/location data to reveal intimate details and noting limits on government surveillance)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (establishing reasonable expectation of privacy test)
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (warrant required where technology reveals details of the home previously unknowable)
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (government‑elicited transmissions that reveal interior-of-home facts can be a search)
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (GPS tracking and historical surveillance raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns)
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (Mass. analysis of CSLI and privacy expectations)
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808 (GPS tracking and property/privacy distinctions)
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 (distinguishing historical call‑detail CSLI access; articulated six‑hour rule for historical telephone‑call CSLI)
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204 (exigent‑circumstances factors in post‑crime searches)
Commonwealth v. One 1985 Ford Thunderbird Auto., 416 Mass. 603 (considering nature of intrusion in reasonable‑expectation analysis)