Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31

Appellant Ricky L. Allshouse pled guilty to aggravated assault and resisting arrest in Clearfield County (2005) and received a two-year probation term to be supervised by the Board, after a one-to-two year state incarceration.
Appellant was sentenced in a separate Jefferson County case (2005) to 1–3 years, with that term to run consecutively to the Clearfield sentence.
DOC aggregated the two sentences into a single 2–5 year incarceration period, during which Appellant served the maximum sentence and incurred institutional violations.
After exhausting the aggregate maximum, Appellant was detained on a Clearfield probation violation order arising from his prior sentence.
At a series of hearings (July–September 2010), the trial court and Commonwealth argued over when probation began; Appellant contested that probation had effectively been served during incarceration.
On September 13, 2010, the trial court revoked probation and resentenced Appellant to 10 months to 3 years’ imprisonment; judgment of sentence followed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Board's start-date determination violate separation of powers?	Allshouse contends Board set probation start, unlawfully altering judicial timing.	Court-ordered aggregation fixes start; Board action consistent with statutory framework.	No separation-of-powers violation; aggregation fixes start with no judicial disruption.
Was revocation proper for failing to sign probation conditions not imposed by the court?	Revocation based on failure to sign is improper where not a court-imposed term.	Written acknowledgment is an implied condition; failure supports revocation.	Probation revocation based on written acknowledgment was proper as an implied condition.

Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488 (2003) (separation of powers and court authority boundaries)
First Judicial Dist. of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 727 A.2d 1110 (1999) (separation of powers limits executive intrusion into judiciary)
Commonwealth v. Ford-Bey, 590 A.2d 782 (1991) (mandatory sentence aggregation governs consecutive terms)
Commonwealth v. Harris, 620 A.2d 1175 (1993) (aggregation decisions confirm statutory effect)
Commonwealth v. Vilsaint, 893 A.2d 753 (2006) (court—not probation officer—imposes probation terms; implied conditions are recognized)
Commonwealth v. MacGregor, 912 A.2d 315 (2006) (revocation based on terms imposed by court; distinction when terms come from probation office)
Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628 (1980) (probation can be revoked prior to commencement if defendant is deemed unworthy)
Commonwealth v. Ballard, 814 A.2d 1242 (2003) (balancing society interests and rehabilitation in probation revocation)
Commonwealth v. Shimonvich, 858 A.2d 132 (2004) (revoke probation with proof of violation as per standard)