125 N.E.3d 39
Mass.2019Background
- Police served in-hand written notice on Mark Adams that his Class A firearms license was suspended and demanded surrender of firearms; Adams refused, insisted on counsel, and attempted to reenter his home; officers physically restrained and arrested him.
- District Court suppressed evidence from the warrantless entry and seizure of firearms; Commonwealth dismissed the statutory failure-to-surrender charge and proceeded on common-law interference with a police officer (plus other charges), of which the jury convicted Adams of interference and acquitted on others.
- Adams appealed, arguing (inter alia) that the common-law offense is not recognized in Massachusetts, that statutes and the Second Amendment precluded the police action, and that the evidence was insufficient.
- The Supreme Judicial Court (on its own motion transferring the case) addressed for the first time whether interference with a police officer is a Massachusetts common-law crime, its elements and limits, and whether the evidence supported Adams’s conviction.
- The Court held that interference with a police officer is a Massachusetts common-law offense but is limited so as not to criminalize protected speech or lawful exercise of rights; applying those limits, the Court found the evidence insufficient and vacated the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Adams's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Is interference with a police officer a Massachusetts common-law crime? | It is part of Massachusetts common law and has historical support. | (Adams did not contest this below; argued statutory/sufficiency issues) | Yes; the Court recognizes the offense exists in Massachusetts common law. |
| 2. What conduct does the common-law offense prohibit? | Broadly, willful obstruction, hindrance, threats, or physical interference with an officer performing lawful duties. | Crime should not reach conduct protected by constitutional rights (speech, lawful acts). | Requires: officer lawfully performing duty; a physical act (or threatening violence) that obstructs/hinders; awareness officer was performing duty; specific intent to obstruct. |
| 3. Were the officers acting in the lawful performance of their duty when demanding surrender? | The officers could demand immediate surrender under G. L. c. 140 §§129D,131(f) when person deemed unsuitable; thus they acted lawfully. | Adams argued statutory provisions allowed retention pending appeal and that officers lacked lawful authority to seize without warrant. | The statutes can be harmonized; licensing authority may seek immediate surrender when person is deemed unsuitable; jury could find officers were acting lawfully. |
| 4. Was evidence sufficient to prove Adams committed common-law interference? | Adams’s refusal and directives to family amounted to interference. | Refusal alone, insistence on counsel, and protest were insufficient; no physical obstruction or threats. | Insufficient: prosecution failed to prove a physical act or threats intended to obstruct; conviction vacated and verdict of not guilty ordered. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162 (1911) (Mass. Constitution preserves pre-1780 common law until altered by Legislature)
- Chapman, 13 Met. 68 (1847) (common law brought from England and adapted; crimes of murder/manslaughter left to common law)
- Commonwealth v. Hastings, 9 Met. 259 (1845) (early Massachusetts case discussing assault on officer and obstructing/hindering as aggravation or separate charge)
- Commonwealth v. Kirby, 2 Cush. 577 (1849) (treats hindering a constable as an aggravating circumstance to assault)
- Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (ordinance criminalizing interruption of police was overbroad; protects verbal criticism absent conduct)
- Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2017) (First Circuit affirmed probable cause to arrest for Massachusetts common-law interference where plaintiff physically blocked work and officers performing lawful duty)