Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam
42 A.3d 983
Pa.2012Background
- Capital murder case; Abdul-Salaam appealed PCRA denial related to a third petition involving a Brady materiality cumulation analysis.
- Clifton/Harlacker pretrial interview evidence (Harlacker report) allegedly undisclosed; Clifton claimed involvement but could not identify the other man; this was a basis for a prior Brady claim.
- New blood evidence from federal habeas discovery showed DNA on steering wheel matching Anderson, not appellant, potentially supporting cumulation analysis.
- Two prior PCRA petitions addressed: Abdul-Salaam II (2001) and Abdul-Salaam III (2002) with subsequent federal habeas considerations guiding the current petition.
- Trial evidence included four eyewitness identifications of appellant as shooter, getaway driver identification of Anderson, appellant’s wound, bloody clothing found at girlfriend’s home, and a statement to a police officer indicating Anderson’s involvement; this evidence weighed against relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brady cumulation requires relief based on Clifton and new blood evidence. | Abdul-Salaam: cumulative suppression warrants materiality finding. | Commonwealth: cumulation fails to show reasonable probability of different outcome. | No relief; cumulative evidence not material. |
| Whether Clifton evidence was material or exculpatory under Kyles/Brady. | Clifton could exculpate co-conspirator, potentially exculpate Abdul-Salaam. | Clifton not exculpatory; highly intoxicated, cannot exculpate. | Not material or exculpatory; no Brady violation. |
| Whether the new blood/DNA evidence changes the materiality analysis. | New DNA evidence could alter the outcome. | Evidence supports Anderson’s role but does not exculpate Abdul-Salaam. | Not material to acquittal; cumulative impact insufficient. |
| Whether the trial evidence, viewed collectively, proves a reasonable probability of different result. | Cumulative suppression could yield different outcome. | Overwhelming trial evidence defeats prejudice claim. | No reasonable probability of different outcome; no relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (require consideration of cumulative suppressed evidence in materiality)
- Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (U.S. 2009) (discusses cumulative effect of suppressed evidence)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1999) (harmlessness and materiality in Brady analyses)
- Commonwealth v. Lambert, 584 Pa. 461 (Pa. 2005) (Pa. Supreme Court on Brady materiality)