Commonwealth of Virginia v. Shawn Lynn Botkin
68 Va. App. 177
| Va. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Shawn Lynn Botkin pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted nonviolent felon under Va. Code § 18.2-308.2(A).
- The statute prescribes mandatory minimum terms (five years for prior violent-felony, two years for other felonies within 10 years) and states those mandatory minimums "shall be served consecutively with any other sentence."
- The trial court imposed five-year sentences on each count, suspended three years of each, leaving two active years on each count, and then ordered the two active sentences to run concurrently.
- The Commonwealth appealed under Va. Code § 19.2-398(C), arguing the mandatory minimums must run consecutively and the trial court lacked discretion to make them concurrent.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and considered whether § 18.2-308.2 removes the general concurrency/discretion under Va. Code § 19.2-308.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court could order two § 18.2-308.2 mandatory minimums to run concurrently | Commonwealth: mandatory language requires consecutive service of mandatory minimums; concurrency not permitted | Botkin: § 19.2-308 gives trial court discretion to order concurrent sentences; statute does not bar concurrency for multiple § 18.2-308.2 convictions | The court held § 18.2-308.2's plain language unambiguously requires the mandatory minimum terms to be served consecutively with any other sentence, including another § 18.2-308.2 sentence; the trial court erred in ordering concurrency |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 538 (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Altizer v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 317 (apply plain meaning when statute unambiguous)
- Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316 (statutory language controls when legislative intent is clear)
- Temple v. City of Petersburg, 182 Va. 418 (no construction where text is clear)
- Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335 (determine legislative intent from statutory words)
- Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573 (avoid unreasonably restrictive interpretations that subvert legislative intent)
- Barr v. Town & Country Props., Inc., 240 Va. 292 (harmonize general and specific statutes; specific prevails)
- Va. Nat. Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336 (statutory construction principles)
- Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 284 Va. 695 (court will not add words to change an unambiguous statute)