Commonwealth of Ky. v. Janet Yellen
21-6108
6th Cir.Nov 18, 2022Background
- Congress enacted ARPA (2021) and allocated ~$195.3 billion to states; funds conditioned by an "Offset Provision" banning use of ARPA funds to "directly or indirectly offset" reductions in net tax revenue from tax cuts during the covered period.
- The statute included reporting requirements and a recoupment mechanism authorizing Treasury to recover funds used in violation.
- Treasury issued an Interim Final Rule and then a Final Rule defining the baseline (fiscal year 2019, inflation‑adjusted) and creating safe harbors (macroeconomic growth, other tax increases, or non‑ARPA spending cuts) and explaining enforcement approach.
- Kentucky and Tennessee sued pre‑enforcement, alleging the Offset Provision was vague, coercive/commandeering, and caused (for Tennessee) present compliance costs; the district court enjoined enforcement based on coercion.
- Sixth Circuit: Treasury’s Rule mooted Kentucky’s challenge (no evidence Kentucky would violate the Rule), so injunction vacated as to Kentucky; Tennessee had standing based on uncontroverted compliance‑cost declarations and the Court affirmed the injunction on the ground that the Offset Provision is impermissibly vague under Spending Clause clear‑statement principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justiciability/standing (Kentucky) | Kentucky accepted funds and plans tax cuts; Offset Provision arguably bars post‑acceptance tax cuts so enforcement threat is imminent. | Treasury’s Rule disavows the broad money‑is‑fungible reading; Kentucky submitted no evidence it will violate the Rule. | Moot/nonjusticiable as to Kentucky; injunction vacated. |
| Justiciability/standing (Tennessee) | Tennessee showed present compliance costs (staffing, new accounting, baseline adjustments) traceable to Offset/Rule. | Treasury argued costs are traceable only to reporting req’t or are defeasible because ARPA funds may reimburse administrative costs. | Tennessee has Article III standing on compliance‑cost theory; claim remains justiciable. |
| Spending Clause clear‑statement / vagueness of Offset Provision | Statute fails to give clear notice: "indirectly offset," causation, timing, baseline and measuring reductions are indeterminate; states coerced. | The statutory text gives sufficient notice that a condition exists; Rule explains details and Trackable safe harbors; agency interpretation supplies clarity. | Offset Provision fails clear‑statement requirement (vague); Treasury cannot enforce obligations not clearly authorized by Congress; injunction affirmed as to Tennessee on vagueness ground. |
| Role/effect of Treasury Rule and deference | Plaintiffs: Rule cannot cure constitutional vagueness because Congress must speak clearly under Spending Clause. | Treasury: Rule clarifies statute and its interpretation follows from the text; agency construction disavows fungibility reading and moots Kentucky. | Rule mooted Kentucky’s recoupment/sovereign‑authority claims (lack of evidence), but Rule cannot supply the clear notice required by Spending Clause; agency cannot cure statutory indeterminacy for Tennessee’s claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 142 S. Ct. 1562 (2022) (articulates Spending Clause clear‑statement notice requirement)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (pre‑enforcement standing/credible threat framework)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (constitutional standing elements)
- Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (federal spending conditions must be unambiguous)
- Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (reciter of clear‑notice principle for conditional grants)
- Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 142 S. Ct. 1638 (2022) (injury from a regulation implementing a statute can be traceable to the statute)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (state sovereign/quasi‑sovereign injury doctrine; "special solicitude")
- United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989) (recognition that money is fungible)
- Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 562 U.S. 61 (2011) (same, re: fungibility of money)
