599 S.W.3d 409
Ky.2020Background
- Three defendants (Bredhold, Diaz, Smith) were indicted for murder and related offenses; they were ages 18–20 at the time of their alleged crimes and the Commonwealth notified intent to seek death.
- Each moved pretrial to bar the death penalty as unconstitutional for offenders under 21, relying on evolving Eighth Amendment standards and expert evidence (affidavits and Dr. Laurence Steinberg’s testimony on adolescent development).
- The Fayette Circuit Court granted the motions and held Kentucky’s death-penalty statute unconstitutional as applied to offenders under 21; the Commonwealth appealed interlocutorily to the Kentucky Supreme Court.
- The Commonwealth argued Roper v. Simmons established 18 as the Eighth Amendment bright line and that the trial court erred in ruling pretrial; appellees argued national consensus and science now support raising the cutoff to 21.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded the issue was not justiciable pretrial because none of the defendants had been convicted or sentenced (no concrete, imminent injury), vacated the circuit court’s interlocutory orders, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits death for offenders under 21 | Evolving standards of decency and recent neuroscientific/psychological evidence justify extending Roper’s protection to <21 | Roper sets 18 as the constitutional cutoff; circuit court overstepped by extending it to 21 | Not decided on the merits — court found the claim non-justiciable pretrial (vacated the orders) |
| Whether defendants had standing to bring a pretrial Eighth Amendment challenge | Defendants face heightened risk because Commonwealth sought death; pretrial relief prevents the threat | Commonwealth: no conviction or sentence yet; injury is speculative | Held no standing: plaintiffs lacked the concrete/imminent injury required; challenge premature |
| Whether the circuit court may bar death as a sentencing option pretrial | Defendants: court may declare statute unconstitutional as-applied before trial | Commonwealth: removal of a statutorily authorized penalty pretrial is improper; sentencing procedures and mitigation may alter outcome | Held circuit court erred to decide pretrial; appropriate review arises after conviction and a jury death recommendation (then trial judge and appellate review apply) |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of offenders under 18; relied on evolving standards and developmental science)
- Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (previously allowed capital punishment for offenders 16–17; later abrogated by Roper)
- Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (Eighth Amendment forbids execution of offenders under 16)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencing requires consideration of broad mitigating evidence, including youth)
- Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury; speculative future injuries insufficient)
- City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983) (Eighth Amendment scrutiny relates to actual imposition of punishment after conviction)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (constitutional standing framework: injury, causation, redressability)
- Sexton v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. 2018) (Kentucky adopts Lujan standing test; courts must assess standing sua sponte)
- Commonwealth v. Guernsey, 501 S.W.3d 884 (Ky. 2016) (circuit court may rule on inherent disproportionality only after conviction and a jury death recommendation)