Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Phillip Dixon
2016 Ky. LEXIS 11
| Ky. | 2016Background
- KSP received an anonymous tip that Phillip Dixon was using/producing meth in a trailer behind his mother’s house. Troopers White and Smith went to investigate.
- Troopers approached to conduct a warrantless knock-and-talk at the front; Dixon came out and refused consent to search.
- Trooper Smith walked around the side/back of the trailer (about 15 feet from the rear) and reported seeing bottles consistent with one-step meth labs; troopers smelled chemical odors and saw smoke at the back door.
- Troopers entered the trailer, evacuated occupants under exigent‑circumstances reasoning, observed meth precursors in plain view, called a KSP clean‑up unit, and obtained a search warrant.
- Dixon moved to suppress evidence, arguing the troopers had invaded the trailer’s curtilage during the knock‑and‑talk. Trial court denied suppression; Court of Appeals reversed; Kentucky Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Trooper Smith’s movement to ~15 ft behind the trailer invaded protected curtilage | Dixon: the trooper left the normal knock‑and‑talk approach and entered curtilage, so observations and subsequent entry were unlawful | Commonwealth: Smith’s vantage point was outside curtilage (open/dumping area, no enclosure, unmaintained grass), so observations were lawful | Court: Trooper Smith was outside curtilage based on Dunn factors and uncontroverted testimony; observations lawful |
| Whether evidence observed from that vantage could justify exigent‑circumstances entry and warrant | Dixon: observations flowed from illegal vantage, so evidence and warrant tainted | Commonwealth: lawful observations supported exigent entry and a later warrant | Court: because observations were lawful, exigent entry and warrant were proper |
| Standard of review for suppression factual findings | Dixon: factual inferences should be resolved against police where doubt exists | Commonwealth: trial court’s factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence | Court: affirms that trial court’s factual findings stand if supported by substantial evidence; legal application reviewed de novo |
| Application of Dunn four‑factor test to knock‑and‑talk deviations | Dixon: once officer leaves main approach, Dunn curtilage analysis applies and here it favors Dixon | Commonwealth: applied Dunn and facts show vantage outside curtilage | Court: applied Dunn, considered context of all factors, and found in favor of Commonwealth |
Key Cases Cited
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (clarifies open‑fields doctrine and that open fields fall outside Fourth Amendment curtilage protection)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (establishes four‑factor test for curtilage: proximity, enclosure, use, steps to protect privacy)
- California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (observations from a lawful public vantage do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment, even if area is within curtilage)
- Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (extends Ciraolo: aerial observation from public navigable airspace did not require a warrant)
- Quintana v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 753 (Ky. 2008) (when officers deviate from approach to main entrance, courts must apply Dunn to the new vantage point)