Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Rose, S.
127 A.3d 794
Pa.2015Background
- In 1993 Rose brutally assaulted Mary Mitchell; she survived in a vegetative state until her death in 2007. Rose was convicted in 1994 of attempted murder and related offenses and served time; in 2007 he was charged and convicted of third-degree murder for the earlier assault.
- At the time of the 1993 assault, the maximum sentence for third-degree murder was 20 years under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1). In 1995 the legislature amended the law (18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(d)) increasing the maximum to 40 years.
- The trial court sentenced Rose to 20–40 years for the 2007 third-degree murder conviction. Rose argued this application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; the Superior Court (en banc) vacated and remanded for resentencing.
- The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, arguing the offense was not "committed" until the victim died in 2007 and thus the 1995 amendment applied prospectively to the homicide.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court: applying the increased penalty violated the federal (and state) Ex Post Facto Clause because the relevant criminal acts occurred before the amendment and the amendment increased the punishment for those prior acts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Rose) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a penalty-enhancing statute enacted after a defendant's criminal acts but before the fatal result may be applied without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause | Homicide is not complete until death; because the death (and thus the crime) occurred in 2007, the 1995 amended sentencing statute governs (no retroactivity) | The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids increasing punishment for acts committed before the law changed; date of the criminal acts (1993) controls for ex post facto purposes | Held for Rose: applying the 1995 harsher sentencing provision violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; resentencing required |
| Whether the Ex Post Facto prohibition is limited to fully consummated crimes (not prior acts) | Ex Post Facto protects only past completed crimes; substitution of "acts" for "crime" is improper | Historical and Supreme Court precedent focus on retroactive punishment for prior acts; fair warning requires using date of acts | Held: Clause applies to prior criminal acts (not limited to fully completed crimes); statute increased punishment for pre-enactment acts and thus violated the Clause |
| Whether lack of specific intent (third-degree murder) negates fair-warning interest under Ex Post Facto | Because third-degree murder lacks specific intent, notice of penalty is irrelevant; no reliance interest | Reliance/notice is not the sole purpose of the Clause; prohibiting retroactive punishment protects fairness even if intent element differs | Held: Absence of specific intent does not eliminate Ex Post Facto protection; statute still prohibited from retroactive increase |
| Whether sentencing under the later statute was an "as-applied" constitutional violation | Commonwealth: no retroactivity—statute applied at time crime (death) occurred | Rose: as-applied challenge—application to him is unconstitutional because it punishes pre-enactment acts more severely | Held: As-applied challenge succeeds; imposition of the greater sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (original articulation of ex post facto categories)
- Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) (ex post facto forbids punishing past acts more harshly)
- De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (focus on punishment for past acts as hallmark of ex post facto)
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (effect, not form, determines whether law is ex post facto; critical question is whether legal consequences of completed acts changed)
- Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (historical test: legislatures may not retroactively alter crimes or increase punishments)
- Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (rejecting reliance-only argument; Ex Post Facto Clause protects broader fairness interests)
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (ex post facto inquiry asks whether law creates meaningful risk of increased punishment)
- State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604 (N.C. 1979) (for ex post facto purposes, date of the murderous acts—not the death—controls)