Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Myers, D.
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Myers, D. - No. 7 EAP 2016
| Pa. | Jul 19, 2017Background
- Darrell Myers was arrested in Philadelphia for suspected driving under the influence; the case challenges a blood draw after his detention and his refusal to submit to chemical testing under 75 Pa.C.S. §1547 (Pennsylvania's implied-consent law).
- Myers specifically contested the constitutionality of taking blood from an unconscious motorist and the penalties for refusing testing.
- The Superior Court affirmed suppression denial; the Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (No. 7 EAP 2016).
- Chief Justice Saylor concurred in the result reached by the Superior Court but wrote separately on statutory and constitutional grounds.
- Saylor agreed with Justice Mundy’s statutory interpretation that implied-consent principles apply (consent inferred from driving) but invoked the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota to conclude criminal penalties for refusal render the statutory scheme unconstitutional as applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Myers) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether implied consent under 75 Pa.C.S. §1547 permits warrantless blood draws from an unconscious motorist | Myers argued the blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment and could not be compelled without a warrant; refusal penalties cannot justify taking blood from an unconscious person | Commonwealth argued implied consent (by driving) authorizes testing and that statutory penalties for refusal are permissible as part of the regulatory scheme | Court affirmed conviction overall; Chief Justice Saylor concurred, agreeing implied consent can be inferred from driving but held criminal penalties for refusal to blood draws are unconstitutional under Birchfield as applied |
| Whether criminal penalties for refusal to submit to blood testing are constitutional | Myers argued criminalizing refusal to submit to blood testing infringes Fourth Amendment protections | Commonwealth argued penalties are an acceptable part of implied-consent enforcement and serve public-safety interests in combating drunk driving | Saylor concluded, relying on Birchfield, that criminal penalties for refusal to submit to a blood test violate the Fourth Amendment (and thus suppression is required in this context) |
| Whether Birchfield’s rule applies to unconscious motorists | Myers contended Birchfield’s prohibition on criminalizing refusal should cover unconscious drivers from whom blood is drawn without consent | Commonwealth contended Birchfield focused on conscious refusals and that unconsciousness changes the analysis; warrants remain an option | Saylor acknowledged complexity but, citing Birchfield’s categorical preference, applied its limit to criminal penalties even where the motorist is unconscious, favoring suppression |
| Whether statutory construction of §1547 supports implied consent doctrine | Myers disputed implied-consent reach; statutory language and penalties implicated constitutional protections | Commonwealth relied on §1547(a) to assert that operating a vehicle implies consent to chemical testing | Saylor agreed with Justice Mundy’s statutory reading that voluntary operation implies consent (statutory consent inference) but separated that conclusion from constitutionality of penal sanctions |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (holding states may not criminalize refusal to submit to a blood test under implied-consent schemes)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (holding exigency must be judged case-by-case for warrantless blood draws)
- Neville v. United States, 459 U.S. 553 (U.S. 1983) (discussing consent and voluntariness in chemical-testing context)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2013) (consent can be inferred from context in searches)
- Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1978) (contextual consent and Fourth Amendment principles)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (U.S. 2013) (discussing criminal penalties and Sixth Amendment principles relevant to classification of penalties)