Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Myers, D.
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Myers, D. - No. 7 EAP 2016
Pa.Jul 19, 2017Background
- Defendant Darrell Myers was arrested for suspected DUI, transported to a hospital, and was unconscious when his blood was drawn at police direction.
- Police had probable cause to suspect DUI before the blood draw.
- Pennsylvania’s implied consent statute (75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a)(1)) deems drivers to have consented to breath or blood tests when officers have reasonable grounds for DUI; subsection (b)(1) provides that an arrestee may refuse testing if requested after arrest.
- The Superior Court suppressed the blood evidence, concluding the police failed to afford Myers an opportunity to exercise the statutory refusal right and that McNeely required a warrant analysis.
- Justice Mundy (dissenting) would reverse: she reads the statute to authorize the warrantless blood draw where probable cause exists and the driver did not (and could not) revoke implied consent, and she finds no Fourth Amendment violation in these facts, distinguishing Birchfield for conscious refusals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Myers) | Held (Justice Mundy, dissent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a)(1) authorizes a warrantless blood draw when officer has probable cause but the arrestee had no opportunity to refuse | Statute creates implied consent upon driving; if arrestee does not revoke consent (and had no opportunity to do so), testing is authorized | Failure to provide opportunity to exercise statutory refusal means testing is not authorized without a warrant | Statute authorizes the blood draw where probable cause existed and Myers did not (and could not) revoke implied consent |
| Whether the Fourth Amendment required a warrant (or exigency) for the blood draw under McNeely | McNeely does not create a per se rule; implied consent statutes remain valid and McNeely does not invalidate §1547 | Police needed a warrant because Myers could not exercise statutory refusal and McNeely requires case-by-case exigency analysis | McNeely does not control because statutory implied consent authorized the draw; no Fourth Amendment violation in these facts |
| Effect of Birchfield (prohibiting criminal penalties for refusal) on admissibility/authorization of blood draws | Birchfield bars punishing a conscious refusal but does not address unconscious drivers; where driver is unconscious, statutory refusal cannot be exercised, so Birchfield is inapplicable | Birchfield supports suppression because motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to blood tests on pain of criminal sanction | Birchfield does not apply to unconscious motorists; because Myers could not be penalized for refusal and could not rescind consent, Birchfield is inapposite here |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (no per se exigency for warrantless blood draws; exigency is case-specific)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (warrantless blood draws cannot be criminally compelled; breath tests may be incident to arrest)
- Commonwealth v. Eisenhart, 611 A.2d 681 (Pa. 1992) (statutory refusal under §1547(b) revokes implied consent under §1547(a))
- Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992) ("reasonable grounds" means probable cause)
- Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135 (Pa. 1994) (discussing §1547’s relationship to Fourth Amendment requirements)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (statutory refusal penalties are a legislative grace, not constitutionally required)