Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Lynn, W., 114 A.3d 796

Background

William Lynn was Secretary for Clergy (Archdiocese of Philadelphia), responsible for investigating clergy sexual-abuse allegations and advising on clergy assignments.
In 1994 Lynn reviewed Archdiocesan "Secret Archives," identified priests with prior abuse allegations (including Rev. Edward Avery), and classified Avery as guilty of sexual misconduct with minors.
Lynn recommended, then arranged, housing/assignments for Avery (including a rectory at St. Jerome’s, a parish with a grade school); he did not fully disclose Avery’s history to parish staff or parents.
In 1999 Avery sexually abused D.G., an altar boy at St. Jerome’s. D.G.’s abuse was reported years later (2009).
Lynn was criminally charged under the pre-2007 EWOC statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304 (1995), for "endangering the welfare of a child" (for placing known abusers under his supervision where they could access children); a jury convicted, the Superior Court reversed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, holding the 1995 EWOC statute reaches persons who supervise a child’s welfare (not only those who directly supervise children) and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Lynn’s conviction.

Issues

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Lynn's Argument	Held
Whether the 1995 EWOC statute requires direct, personal supervision of the child (vs. supervision of the child’s welfare)	The statute covers persons who supervise the welfare of children even indirectly (e.g., supervisors who manage those who interact with children); plain language does not require direct contact.	The statute requires actual/direct supervision of the child (like a parent, guardian, babysitter); the 2007 amendment adding "person who employs or supervises such a person" shows pre-2007 law did not reach supervisors-of-supervisors.	The Court held the 1995 statute requires supervision of the child’s welfare (broadly construed) and does not demand direct personal contact with the child; indirect supervisory control suffices.
Whether the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to prove Lynn supervised the welfare of D.G. and other children	Lynn was the Archdiocese’s point person on clergy abuse, had authority over priest assignments, knew Avery was dangerous, and placed/kept Avery where he had access to children.	Lynn argued he had no connection to D.G. or direct supervisory authority over children at St. Jerome’s, so evidence was insufficient.	The Court held the evidence—Lynn’s role, knowledge of Avery’s history, housing/assignment decisions, and failures to warn or restrict—was sufficient to prove he supervised the welfare of children and knowingly endangered them.
Whether reliance on the grand jury, prior DA decision, and the 2007 statutory amendment affects interpretation of the 1995 statute	The 2007 amendment clarified scope but does not change the plain meaning of the 1995 statute; prior prosecutorial decisions and grand-jury views are irrelevant to statutory meaning.	Lynn relied on the grand jury’s conclusion and the 2007 amendment to argue his conduct was outside the 1995 statute’s reach; prosecution under the old statute was improper.	The Court rejected reliance on grand-jury or subsequent amendment to alter the pre-amendment statute’s plain meaning; subsequent legislative change does not retroactively define prior intent.
Whether Halye requires direct supervision for EWOC liability	Commonwealth: Halye does not hold supervision must be direct; it merely found no duty existed in that factual setting.	Lynn: Halye establishes that EWOC requires actual supervision of the child.	The Court held Halye is factually distinct and does not stand for a rule requiring direct supervision; it does not bar liability for indirect supervisors.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Mack, 359 A.2d 770 (Pa. 1976) (EWOC is a protective statute to be construed broadly to safeguard children)
Commonwealth v. Marlin, 305 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1973) (juvenile protective statutes may criminalize conduct tending to produce defined harmful results)
Commonwealth v. Halye, 719 A.2d 763 (Pa. Super. 1998) (reversed EWOC conviction where defendant had no duty or supervisory responsibility for the child)
Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. 1986) (EWOC is a specific-intent offense requiring knowledge of a duty and knowing violation of that duty)