Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Childs, W.
2016 Pa. LEXIS 1534
Pa.2016Background
- In July 2010 William Childs stabbed and killed Bryant Bell after Bell forcefully entered a residence where Childs was present; Childs was charged with homicide and PIC.
- On June 28, 2011 the General Assembly amended 18 Pa.C.S. § 505 by adding § 505(b)(2.1), creating a presumption that deadly force is reasonably necessary when a person unlawfully and forcefully enters a dwelling and the actor knows or has reason to believe the entry occurred.
- Childs was tried twice (Nov. 2011 and Nov. 2012); he requested a jury instruction incorporating § 505(b)(2.1) (the “castle doctrine” presumption) at both trials; the trial court refused the instruction.
- The Commonwealth argued the statute could not be applied to Childs because it became effective after the underlying events and lacked explicit retroactive application; it also contended the statute was substantive (part of a broader change to self-defense law).
- The Superior Court held § 505(b)(2.1) was procedural (an evidentiary presumption) and therefore applicable to Childs’ trials, vacated his sentence, and remanded for a new trial.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed: § 505(b)(2.1) codifies an evidentiary presumption (not a change in substantive rights) and, being procedural, applied to trials held after its effective date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Childs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 505(b)(2.1) may be applied to prosecutions for events that occurred before its enactment but were tried after its effective date | Statute lacks express retroactive language; per Shaffer and related principles, it should not be applied to pending cases because it changes substantive rights | Statute creates only an evidentiary presumption (procedural) that helps enforce the existing castle doctrine and therefore applies to trials after enactment | Held: § 505(b)(2.1) is procedural (an evidentiary presumption) and applied to Childs’ trials held after the statute’s effective date; new trial ordered |
| Whether § 505(b)(2.1) substantively broadened the right to use deadly force in a dwelling | Part of Act 10’s broader self-defense overhaul; therefore it alters substantive rights and should not be applied retroactively | § 505(b)(2.1) does not change elements of self-defense or the no-duty-to-retreat castle doctrine; it merely provides a mechanism to infer reasonable belief from specified predicate facts | Held: The amendment did not change the substantive elements of the castle doctrine; it only codified an evidentiary presumption |
| Whether Morabito’s Auto Sales requires prospectivity for legislative presumptions regardless of procedural/substantive label | Morabito suggests a presumption dependent on a pre-existing statutory duty cannot be applied when the duty did not exist at the time of the events | The present presumption stands independently as an evidentiary rule and is not like the Morabito presumption tethered to an antecedent procedural duty | Held: Morabito is distinguishable; § 505(b)(2.1) is not a piecemeal reliance on a presumption that required the creation of a separate duty at the time of the events |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Fraser, 369 Pa. 273, 85 A.2d 126 (recognizing long-standing castle doctrine in Pennsylvania)
- Morabito's Auto Sales v. Commonwealth, 552 Pa. 291, 715 A.2d 384 (discusses limits on applying evidentiary presumptions created by statute when tied to procedural duties absent at time of events)
- Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 557 Pa. 453, 734 A.2d 840 (statutory changes construed prospectively absent clear legislative intent; retroactivity principles)
- Commonwealth v. Estman, 591 Pa. 116, 915 A.2d 1191 (procedural statutes apply to pending litigation)
- Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 561 Pa. 571, 752 A.2d 384 (discusses role of presumptions and inferences in factfinding)