358 F. Supp. 3d 505
E.D.N.C.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (Common Cause, the N.C. Democratic Party, and 38 registered Democratic voters) sued state officials challenging North Carolina's 2017 legislative districting plans as violating the North Carolina Constitution and seeking new plans if the General Assembly failed to act.
- Legislative Defendants (four state legislators in official capacities) removed the case from Wake County Superior Court to federal district court, asserting federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443(2) and 1441(a).
- State Defendants (the State of North Carolina and the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement) opposed removal and agreed the case should be remanded to state court.
- Plaintiffs moved to remand; the federal court granted the motion, remanding the case and denying plaintiffs’ request for costs and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
- The court evaluated whether removal was proper under § 1443(2) (the "refusal" clause) and § 1441(a) (federal-question removal), resolving doubts in favor of remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2) ("refusing to do" clause) | The state-court suit challenges the 2017 plans under state law and should remain in state court. | Legislative Defs. argued § 1443(2) permits removal because there is a colorable conflict between state-court relief and federal law and removal protects officials who would refuse to enforce conflicting state law. | Remand. Court found § 1443(2) inapplicable: plaintiffs do not sue legislators for "refusing to do" anything; legislators are not enforcement officials; any federal conflict is speculative. |
| Whether removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (arising-under federal-question) | The complaint pleads only state constitutional claims, so it does not arise under federal law. | Legislative Defs. argued federal law is "necessarily raised" because compliance with federal law is an express condition of the state constitution. | Remand. Court applied well-pleaded complaint rule and Gunn factors, finding federal issue not necessarily raised and removal improper. |
| Whether defendants had an objectively unreasonable basis for removal (fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)) | Plaintiffs sought costs and attorneys’ fees for removal delay. | Legislative Defs. maintained removal was objectively reasonable and timely. | Fees denied. Court found removal arguments objectively reasonable and declined to award fees. |
| Whether any procedural or sovereign-immunity arguments alter remand analysis | Plaintiffs raised procedural defects and sovereign-immunity concerns. | Defendants raised state-law and jurisdictional counterarguments. | Not reached. Court remanded on jurisdictional grounds and did not consider additional procedural or sovereign-immunity claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1966) (interpreting the scope and legislative history of § 1443 refusal clause)
- City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) (discussing § 1443 and the refusal-to-enforce language)
- Cavanagh v. Brock, 577 F. Supp. 176 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (district court previously allowed removal in a North Carolina redistricting challenge described as restraining the State from implementing plans)
- Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354 (2002) (N.C. Supreme Court: federal-law compliance is an express condition of state constitutional provisions; discussed by the federal court in analyzing removability)
- Alonzo v. City of Corpus Christi, 68 F.3d 944 (5th Cir. 1995) (removal upheld where a colorable federal conflict existed between a federal decree and state action)
- Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1994) (burden on removing party; removal strictly construed)
- Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (four-factor test for when a state-law claim "arises under" federal law)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (federal defenses do not create federal-question jurisdiction)
- Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005) (standard for awarding attorney’s fees on remand)