Common Cause Indiana v. Connie Lawson, 978 F.3d 1036

Background:

In 2019 Indiana amended its election code: (1) a "standing" provision allows only a county election board—by unanimous vote—to sue to extend polling hours; (2) a "remedies" provision limits when and how courts may order extensions (must show substantial delays, limit extensions to duration of closure and to affected polls).
Common Cause sued state election officials seeking a preliminary injunction, alleging the amendments (a) unconstitutionally burden the right to vote (Anderson–Burdick), (b) violate the Supremacy Clause by impeding § 1983 suits in state court, and (c) deny procedural due process.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding the amendments likely violated the right to vote and later concluding they also violated the Supremacy Clause; it denied a stay of that injunction.
Indiana officials appealed and sought a stay pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit reviewed under the Nken stay factors and Purcell timing concerns.
The Seventh Circuit held the district court erred: the amendments do not impose a constitutional voting burden, do not eliminate § 1983 jurisdiction, and do not deprive voters of a protected interest; the court granted a stay of the injunction and summarily reversed the preliminary injunction.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2019 amendments unconstitutionally burden the right to vote (Anderson–Burdick)	Amendments functionally prevent voters from obtaining timely court-ordered extensions and thus risk disenfranchisement	Evaluate burdens on the whole election system; the statutes merely define a state-law remedy and are reasonably tailored to prevent frivolous last-minute suits	Reversed: plaintiff unlikely to prevail; amendments do not impose a constitutional voting burden
Whether the amendments violate the Supremacy Clause by limiting § 1983 suits in state court	Amendments strip state courts of jurisdiction over § 1983 suits seeking polling-hour extensions, immunizing officials from federal claims	Statutes create a state-law cause of action with limits; they do not—and cannot—limit federal § 1983 claims in state court	Reversed: amendments reasonably read as regulating a state-law remedy and do not eliminate § 1983 jurisdiction
Whether amendments deny procedural due process by removing a statutory vehicle to challenge poll hours	Voters have a statutory liberty interest in poll hours and were deprived of process to protect that interest	Even if an interest exists, the amendments do not deprive anyone of the ability to vote; mere jeopardy to interest is not a due-process violation	Reversed: no cognizable due-process violation shown
Whether the district court’s injunction should be stayed given Purcell and Nken factors (timing, irreparable harm, public interest)	Purcell inapplicable because amendments affect election-day activities only; injunction did not alter ongoing election operations	Purcell counsel against last-minute changes; plaintiff delayed more than a year; enjoining state election rules close to an election would irreparably harm the State	Stay granted: officials likely to succeed on appeal, injunction would cause irreparable harm, and Purcell supports stay

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (establishes the Anderson–Burdick balancing test for election regulations)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (applies and clarifies Anderson balancing approach)
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (federal courts should be cautious about changing election rules close to an election)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (stay-pending-appeal factors and standard)
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (states cannot curtail federal causes of action by altering state-court jurisdiction)
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (recognizes irreparable harm to states from preventing them administering elections under state law)
Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665 (Seventh Circuit guidance to assess burdens in context of the whole electoral system)
Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482 (injunctions must be no broader than their legal justification)