Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Attorney General
108 N.E.3d 966
Mass.2018Background
- Sonja Farak, an Amherst State Laboratory chemist (2004–2013), stole and consumed lab "standards," tampered with police-submitted samples, and manipulated inventory and evidence packaging, compromising sample integrity.
- The Amherst lab had lax oversight; Farak began taking standards in 2004, escalated to police-submitted samples by ~2009, and tampered with other chemists' samples by 2012.
- Attorney General prosecutors received mental-health records and other documents indicating earlier and broader misconduct but withheld them from defense and a Superior Court judge, misleading the court.
- Judge Carey found widespread Farak misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct by two assistant AGs (withholding evidence and deceptive statements), concluding dismissal with prejudice was appropriate for some defendants.
- Many district attorneys agreed to vacate and dismiss ~8,000 convictions where Farak signed the certificate; dispute remained over broader relief for convictions based on Amherst-tested samples analyzed by other chemists.
- The SJC exercised superintendence, defined the class of affected defendants, ordered vacatur and dismissal for that class, and directed rule-review to improve Brady disclosures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of "Farak defendants" entitlement to vacatur/dismissal | All convictions based on samples tested at Amherst during Farak's tenure should be vacated (global remedy) because the Commonwealth's investigation was inadequate and scope unknowable | Limit relief to cases where Farak signed the drug certificate; no evidence other chemists' work was compromised | Court defined "Farak defendants" to include: (1) cases where Farak signed certificate; (2) all methamphetamine convictions tested during her tenure; and (3) all convictions based on samples tested at Amherst Jan 1, 2009–Jan 18, 2013 — these convictions are vacated and dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether "third letter" cases require relief (reprosecution-eligible Bridgeman category) | Petitioners sought global relief including third-letter cases | District attorneys had agreed to dismiss remaining third-letter cases | Moot — remaining third-letter cases were dismissed by DAs, so no further relief required |
| Appropriate remedial standard for prosecutorial + lab misconduct (dismissal vs. case-by-case) | Widespread, deliberate misconduct and concealment by prosecutors justify dismissal with prejudice as necessary deterrent and practical relief | Bridgeman II protocol or narrower remedies suffice; dismissal is drastic and should be limited | Where misconduct is egregious, intentional, and produces presumptive prejudice, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate; tailored remedy here expands beyond Bridgeman II given prosecutorial fraud |
| Prophylactic reforms to prevent future nondisclosure | Require standing Brady orders, timelines, and protocols (e.g., Bridgeman/Cotto standing orders) | Existing Rule 14 and professional conduct rules suffice; prefer case-specific responses | Court declined standing Bridgeman/Cotto orders but referred Rule 14 amendments to the court’s rules committee to draft a Brady checklist and clarifying amendments; also ordered AG’s office to bear notification costs for dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Cotto, 471 Mass. 97 (2015) (examined Farak scope and remanded for further investigation)
- Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 Mass. 85 (2015) (companion decision addressing postconviction claims tied to Amherst lab)
- Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298 (2017) (established protocol for large-scale lab-misconduct remediation and limits on global dismissal)
- Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014) (Dookhan precedents and discussion of remedial scope)
- Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194 (1985) (dismissal with prejudice is a remedy of last resort; standards for dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct)
- Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 Mass. 566 (1989) (dismissal as deterrent when misconduct poisons investigation)
- Commonwealth v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438 (1977) (dismissal where indictment inextricably intertwined with prior misconduct)
- Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301 (1984) (dismissal requires showing of irremediable harm when prosecutor fails to disclose)
- Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 475 Mass. 1003 (2016) (describes "Ruffin defendants" who pleaded guilty before testing results)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)