Commissioner of Political Practices for the State Ex Rel. Mangan v. Wittich
400 P.3d 735
| Mont. | 2017Background
- In 2014 the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices sued State Senator Art Wittich for alleged 2010 primary campaign violations (unreported corporate and coordinated in‑kind contributions, and failure to preserve records). A Lewis and Clark County jury found Wittich failed to report $19,599 in corporate contributions. The district court trebled damages and entered judgment for $68,232.58.
- The Commissioner’s investigation originated from a 2010 administrative complaint by Debra Bonogofsky about coordinated mailings; that complaint referenced “other candidates,” leading the Commissioner to investigate Wittich and then file a sufficiency decision and judicial complaint in Lewis and Clark County after the county attorney waived prosecution.
- Wittich moved to dismiss, arguing the Commissioner failed to follow statutory prerequisites (complaint naming him; referral to the proper county attorney). The district court denied dismissal, and this Court affirmed those statutory interpretations on appeal.
- Wittich unsuccessfully moved in limine to exclude two expert witnesses: Commissioner Motl (the Commissioner) and C.B. Pearson (campaign consultant). Both testified at trial; Wittich objected that Motl offered legal conclusions and that Pearson lacked requisite qualifications to value in‑kind mailings.
- Wittich moved for a new trial arguing improper juror dismissal and that the court would not present his constitutional (First Amendment) affirmative defense to the jury; the district court denied the motion. Wittich also challenged trebling of damages; the district court exercised its statutory discretion to treble.
- The Montana Supreme Court affirmed: Commissioner satisfied statutory filing procedures; court did not abuse discretion in admitting expert testimony or denying new trial; trebling of damages was discretionary and not punitive requiring clear‑and‑convincing proof.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commissioner) | Defendant's Argument (Wittich) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Statutory prerequisites to investigation and filing | Bonogofsky’s complaint allowed Commissioner to investigate other alleged violations; no order of noncompliance required when complaint initiated investigation | Complaint did not expressly name Wittich; Commissioner should have issued notice/order of noncompliance before action | Held for Commissioner: statute permits investigating "other alleged violations" included in a complaint; §13‑37‑121(5) makes notice/order unnecessary here |
| 2. Referral to appropriate county attorney under §13‑37‑124 | Commissioner referred to county attorney where alleged violations occurred; Lewis & Clark appropriate for some alleged violations | Violations occurred in Gallatin County; Commissioner failed to notify Gallatin County attorney before filing, depriving court of jurisdiction | Held for Commissioner: issues are statutory interpretation (not jurisdictional); alleged violations also occurred in Lewis & Clark County so referral and waiver were proper |
| 3. Admissibility of expert testimony (Motl and Pearson) | Motl and Pearson were qualified; their testimony assisted the jury on specialized campaign finance facts and valuation | Motl invaded the province of judge/jury by offering legal conclusions; Pearson lacked expertise to value third‑party print/mail costs | Held for Commissioner: district court did not abuse discretion—Motl’s factual and process testimony predominated (legal conclusions not prejudicial); Pearson was qualified by campaign experience and challenges went to weight not admissibility |
| 4. New trial and constitutional affirmative defense | Trial court correctly excluded constitutional determination from jury and preserved procedures for court to decide law; jury instructed on statutory definitions | Trial court prevented presentation of Wittich’s First Amendment defense and erred in dismissing a juror after opening statements | Held for Commissioner: Wittich waived the constitutional claim by not seeking a pretrial ruling or objecting to the instruction at trial; counsel failed to preserve objection to juror removal |
| 5. Trebling damages under §13‑37‑128 | Trebling is discretionary; court may consider seriousness and culpability | Trebling is punitive; requires clear and convincing proof of culpability | Held for Commissioner: trebling is discretionary civil remedy, not punitive for clear‑and‑convincing standard; district court did not abuse discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 308 P.3d 88 (Mont. 2013) (statutory interpretation standard)
- Plath v. Schonrock, 64 P.3d 984 (Mont. 2003) (abuse of discretion standard for discretionary rulings)
- Perdue v. Gagnon Farms, Inc., 65 P.3d 570 (Mont. 2003) (expert testimony may address ultimate issues of fact but not legal conclusions)
- Heltborg v. Modern Mach., 795 P.2d 954 (Mont. 1990) (distinguishing impermissible legal conclusions from permissible ultimate‑fact opinions)
- Hart‑Anderson v. Hauck, 748 P.2d 937 (Mont. 1988) (expert may not state legal conclusions)
- Citizens for a Better Flathead v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 381 P.3d 555 (Mont. 2016) (expert testimony applying law to facts can be inadmissible)
- McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co., 354 P.3d 604 (Mont. 2015) (expert qualification by knowledge, skill, experience; shaky evidence goes to weight)