105 N.E.3d 1207
Mass. App. Ct.2018Background
- Commercial Wharf East Condominium Association (CWECA) appealed the Department of Environmental Protection’s (DEP) 2012 determination that certain condominium property on Commonwealth tidelands was subject to G. L. c. 91 because current parking/vehicular uses were nonwater-dependent and unauthorized without a c. 91 license.
- A hearing officer recommended upholding the DEP determination on summary decision, concluding no genuine dispute of material fact and that only an explicit statute or a c. 91 license could authorize the disputed uses.
- CWECA moved to reopen the administrative proceeding and take discovery of 1970s DPW licensing/correspondence; the hearing officer denied the motion as procedurally improper, because the evidence was not shown to be previously unavailable, and because such correspondence would be legally immaterial.
- The DEP deputy commissioner adopted the recommended decision as final. CWECA then filed for judicial review in Superior Court under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 and separately moved under § 14(6) for leave to present additional evidence (seeking remand to permit discovery).
- The Superior Court granted the § 14(6) motion, effectively overturning the DEP’s evidentiary/procedural rulings and remanding for discovery, and entered judgment; the DEP appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a § 14(6) remand may be used to overturn an agency evidentiary/discovery ruling already made | CWECA argued § 14(6) permits the court to order additional evidence and thus remand for discovery despite the agency’s prior rulings | DEP argued § 14(6) is not a vehicle to review or reverse an agency ruling already made; such challenges must proceed under § 14(7) | Court held § 14(6) may not be used to overturn agency evidentiary/discovery rulings already made; those challenges belong under § 14(7) |
| Standard of review and deference for agency procedural/evidentiary rulings | CWECA urged the court to admit evidence and remand given alleged materiality and good reason | DEP urged deference to agency statutory interpretation, discovery regulation, and procedural discretion, reviewable under § 14(7) standards | Court ruled courts must give due weight/deference under § 14(7) and may not bypass that deferential review by using § 14(6) |
| Finality/appealability of the remand order | CWECA contended the remand was interlocutory and not appealable | DEP invoked Cliff House exception: remand final as to agency and appealable because agency could not otherwise obtain review | Court applied Cliff House and allowed DEP's immediate appeal (remand final as to DEP) |
| Whether the Superior Court should have entered judgment after a § 14(6) remand order | CWECA did not oppose entry of judgment as final relief | DEP argued the court should retain jurisdiction and stay proceedings during remand as § 14(6) contemplates | Court held that if § 14(6) relief were proper, the court must retain jurisdiction and stay proceedings; entering judgment was error |
Key Cases Cited
- Cliff House Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commn., 378 Mass. 189 (Mass. 1979) (establishes exception permitting agency appeal of remand final as to agency)
- Wrentham v. West Wrentham Village, LLC, 451 Mass. 511 (Mass. 2008) (applies Cliff House exception to agency appeals of remand orders)
- Peterborough Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 474 Mass. 443 (Mass. 2016) (agencies’ statutory interpretations are entitled to deference when reasonable)
- White v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 395 Mass. 635 (Mass. 1985) (§ 14(6) contemplates retention of jurisdiction by the reviewing court)
- Brockton Power Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 469 Mass. 215 (Mass. 2014) (agencies have broad discretion over procedural matters; courts should defer)
- Augis Corp. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 398 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (administrative discovery regulation lies within hearing officer’s discretion)