Comerica Bank v. Runyon
16 Cal. App. 5th 473
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2017Background
- Comerica obtained a joint and several money judgment (2010) against Gordon Runyon and others for guaranty breach; some co-debtors later settled or received bankruptcy discharges.
- An abstract of judgment against Gordon was recorded; post-judgment enforcement against property owned by his ex-wife Donna followed after the couple divorced.
- Comerica sought postjudgment attorney fees/costs; a hearing on a cost memorandum occurred November 24, 2015, leaving $1,350 in disputed costs until later resolved.
- Gordon filed an application for an order of contribution (Dec. 29, 2015) under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 881–883, alleging he paid more than his share and seeking contribution from co-judgment debtors (Facciutos, Kissen).
- Trial court denied Gordon’s application as untimely under § 883 (court found judgment balance $0 as of Sept. 9, 2015). Comerica filed an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment June 13, 2016.
- Gordon appealed; Donna’s appeal was dismissed for lack of standing because she was never a party or judgment debtor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an application for contribution under § 883 must plead or prove timeliness | Gordon: statute does not require pleading/proving timeliness; application timely if filed before judgment satisfied in full or within 30 days after | Facciutos/Kissen: application untimely because Comerica’s payment summary showed $0 balance as of Sept. 9, 2015 (more than 30 days before filing) | Court: statute does not require pleading timeliness; timeliness is determined by evidence and court file, not by a pleading requirement |
| When is a judgment “satisfied in full” for § 883 timing? | Gordon: judgment was not satisfied because postjudgment costs remained and no acknowledgment of satisfaction was filed | Opponents: relied on payment summary showing zero balance as of Sept. 9, 2015 | Court: “satisfied in full” means creditor has been paid in full and has filed a full acknowledgment of satisfaction; Gordon’s application preceded that acknowledgment, so it was timely |
| Whether Gordon waived or failed to support his application by relying on reply evidence | Gordon: submitted exhibits and requested leave to amend if form/contents deficient | Opponents: trial court excluded reply evidence and treated application as untimely | Court: appellate record sufficed to decide timeliness without considering disputed reply evidence; remanded for merits consideration on remaining defenses |
| Whether Donna may appeal denial of Gordon’s application | Donna: joined appeal alongside Gordon | Kissen/Facciutos: Donna lacks standing because she was never a party/judgment debtor | Court: Donna lacks standing; her appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730 (Cal. 1971) (defines who is an aggrieved party for appeal standing)
- Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal.3d 727 (Cal. 1988) (statutory language must be read in context; related provisions harmonized)
- Borba Farms, Inc. v. Acheson, 197 Cal.App.3d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("the judgment is satisfied in full" means complete satisfaction of the entire judgment)
- Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee, 185 Cal.App.4th 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (postjudgment enforcement costs become part of the judgment principal)
- Horath v. Hess, 225 Cal.App.4th 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (procedures to compel filing of satisfaction acknowledgment)
- Zeth S., In re, 31 Cal.4th 396 (Cal. 2003) (appellate review limited to record before trial court)
- Hicks v. Barnes, 109 Cal.App.2d 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (trial court is primary factfinder; remand for factual determinations appropriate)
- Romano v. Mercury Ins. Co., 128 Cal.App.4th 1333 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (plain meaning rule in statutory interpretation)
- Burden v. Snowden, 2 Cal.4th 556 (Cal. 1992) (court may not add to clear statutory language)
- California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist., 14 Cal.4th 627 (Cal. 1997) (scrutinize statute words to determine legislative intent)