Comerica Bank v. Runyon, G053691

Background

Comerica obtained a joint and several money judgment in July 2010 against Gordon Runyon and several co-guarantors after borrower defaulted; some co-defendants later settled or received bankruptcy discharges.
An abstract of judgment was issued against Gordon in March 2011; postjudgment enforcement produced multiple payments credited toward the judgment and an order of sale directed at property then owned by Donna Runyon (postdivorce).
Comerica filed a memorandum of costs in March 2015 seeking additional postjudgment attorney fees and costs; a hearing on taxation of those costs occurred November 24, 2015, producing a residual $1,350 outstanding until later paid.
On December 29, 2015, Gordon filed a CCP §883 application for an order of contribution from co-judgment debtors (Kissen and the Facciutos), alleging he paid more than his share through community property contributions and relying on CCP §§881–883.
The trial court denied Gordon’s application as untimely, concluding the judgment balance was $0.00 as of September 9, 2015; Comerica filed a full acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment on June 13, 2016.
On appeal, the court reversed as to Gordon (finding the contribution application was timely), dismissed Donna’s appeal for lack of standing, and remanded for further proceedings on the merits.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness under CCP §883 (when application must be filed)	Gordon: §883 requires application before judgment is satisfied in full or within 30 days after; his application was timely because Comerica had not filed a full acknowledgment of satisfaction	Facciutos/Kissen: Exhibit showed $0 balance by Sept 9, 2015, so application filed Dec 29, 2015 was beyond 30-day window	Court: §883 timing is measured against when judgment is "satisfied in full," which occurs only when creditor is paid and files a full acknowledgment; Gordon’s application was timely — reversed and remanded
Standing to appeal (Donna)	Donna: appealed with Gordon from denial of contribution	Respondents: Donna never a party or judgment debtor; lacks aggrieved interest	Court: Donna never a party/judgment debtor and lacked immediate pecuniary interest; appeal dismissed for Donna
Effect of postjudgment costs on contribution claim	Gordon: postjudgment costs become part of judgment; outstanding postjudgment costs meant judgment not satisfied	Respondents: argued apportionment should be based on original judgment and that contribution for postjudgment fees was improper	Court: Recognized postjudgment enforcement costs become part of the judgment; since postjudgment costs remained unresolved and no acknowledgment filed, judgment was not satisfied for §883 timing; did not decide meritorious apportionment issues — remanded
Procedural/form defects in Gordon’s application	Gordon: application and reply supplied evidence and requested leave to amend if necessary	Kissen/Facciutos: argued application failed to allege proportions, lacked exact relief, and was procedurally defective; also unclean hands	Court: Trial court erred by denying solely on timeliness without reaching these defenses; remanded for the trial court to address them in the first instance

Key Cases Cited

County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730 (1971) (defines who is an "aggrieved" party for standing to appeal)
Borba Farms, Inc. v. Acheson, 197 Cal.App.3d 597 (1988) ("the judgment is satisfied in full" means complete satisfaction of the entire judgment)
Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee, 185 Cal.App.4th 125 (2010) (postjudgment enforcement costs, when allowed, become part of the principal judgment)
Horath v. Hess, 225 Cal.App.4th 456 (2014) (procedures for compelling a creditor to file acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment)
Romano v. Mercury Ins. Co., 128 Cal.App.4th 1333 (2005) (statutory interpretation follows plain meaning; de novo review)
In re Zeth S., 31 Cal.4th 396 (2003) (appellate review limited to matters presented to the trial court)