Com. v. Wright, R.
Com. v. Wright, R. No. 149 MDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Aug 31, 2017Background
- On Nov. 25, 2015, police responded to a multi-vehicle hit-and-run and located Randy D. Wright at a motel; officers ordered him to the ground and arrested him.
- Wright was advised of Miranda rights; during a search incident to arrest officers found cash and Wright told officers he had urine in his vehicle and asked for a hospital blood test.
- Officers asked Wright to submit to field sobriety tests; he claimed physical inability but ultimately consented to a blood draw; his blood later tested positive for controlled substances.
- Wright moved to suppress the blood-test results, arguing consent was coerced (invoking Birchfield) and that police failed to advise him of the right to refuse or explain the purpose/consequences of testing.
- The suppression court denied the motion; following a bench trial Wright was convicted of multiple DUI counts and related summary offenses and sentenced to intermediate punishment.
- On appeal, the Superior Court reviewed voluntariness of consent under the totality of circumstances and affirmed the suppression court’s finding that consent was knowing and voluntary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wright) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wright’s consent to blood draw was voluntary under the Fourth Amendment | Consent was involuntary because Wright was in custody, not "lucid or rational," and police never explained arrest reason, blood-test purpose, or right to refuse | Consent was voluntary: Wright offered to provide blood/urine, received Miranda warnings, and the Implied Consent (DL-26) warning is required only when refusing | Court held consent was knowing and voluntary under totality of circumstances and affirmed suppression court |
| Whether failure to give DL-26 (Implied Consent) warnings invalidates consent | Failure to inform of right to refuse and consequences weighs against voluntariness; police should have explained consequences | The Implied Consent law requires warning before imposing penalties for refusal; when a suspect consents, the DL-26 need not be read to validate consent | Court held DL-26 was not required to obtain valid consent and lack of the warning did not taint consent |
| Whether Birchfield requires a warrant absent informed consent | Wright argued Birchfield prohibits blood draws without warrant or consent free from coercion by threatened penalties | Commonwealth argued Birchfield did not apply because officers did not threaten enhanced penalties and consent preceded any implied-consent warnings | Court applied Birchfield standard: blood test must be by warrant/exigency or voluntary consent; here consent was voluntary, so no warrant required |
| Whether Wright’s unraised claim about mental state can be considered on appeal | Wright asserted his mental state negated voluntariness | Commonwealth noted the specific mental-condition claim was not raised in suppression court | Court declined to entertain a new mental-condition voluntariness claim on appeal and affirmed based on record and suppression-court findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires advisement of rights)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (blood tests require warrant or voluntary consent not procured by threat of criminal penalties)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (U.S. 2011) (Fourth Amendment and warrant-exception principles)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 77 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013) (consent validity judged by objective totality of circumstances including maturity and mental state)
- Commonwealth v. McCoy, 895 A.2d 18 (Pa. Super. 2006) (Implied Consent law requires informing motorists of consequences of refusal but does not require informing where the motorist consents)
- Commonwealth v. Xander, 14 A.3d 174 (Pa. Super. 2011) (DL-26 warning triggers license suspension and enhanced penalties only upon refusal)