Com. v. Wright, O., 3646 EDA 2015

On June 24, 2012, bartender George Fox was fatally stabbed during a robbery at T Bars Tavern in Philadelphia; Wright was arrested and charged with murder and multiple related offenses.
On December 15, 2014, Wright entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and robbery, agreeing to an aggregate sentence of 24 to 50 years; other charges were nolle prossed.
At the plea colloquy Wright signed and initialed the written plea agreement and acknowledged on the record that he understood the 24–50 year sentence.
At sentencing (June 12, 2015) Wright moved pre-sentence to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming counsel failed to advise him the sentences would run consecutively; the trial court denied the motion.
Wright filed a post-sentence motion (June 15, 2015) which the trial court denied; he appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in denying the pre-sentence withdrawal motion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth)	Defendant's Argument (Wright)	Held
Whether trial court abused discretion by denying pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea	Withdrawal should be denied; plea was knowing and voluntary and Wright offered no plausible innocence claim	Wright argued counsel was ineffective for not advising that sentences would run consecutively, and he wanted to withdraw plea	Denied—Wright offered no fair-and-just reason (no plausible innocence claim); plea colloquy and written agreement contradicted his assertions
Standard to apply to pre-sentence withdrawal when plea is negotiated	Prendes: negotiated plea can invoke higher "manifest injustice" standard	Wright argued Forbes liberal pre-sentence standard applies	Court applied Forbes; rejected Commonwealth's reliance on Prendes/Lesko as overruled by Hvizda; even if higher standard applied, Wright would fail
Whether Wright`s ineffective-assistance claim may be resolved on direct appeal	Commonwealth implicitly argued ineffectiveness is part of the record	Wright claimed counsel ineffective for sentencing advice	Court declined to address ineffectiveness on direct appeal, per Holmes/Grant; directed Wright to raise claim in PCRA
Whether Wright was given opportunity to be heard on his withdrawal request	Commonwealth argued Wright had been heard at sentencing	Wright argued he was not afforded a full opportunity	Court found transcript shows the court asked multiple times and Wright spoke; he was afforded opportunity

Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1973) (pre-sentence plea withdrawal governed by "fair and just reason" standard unless substantial prejudice to Commonwealth)
Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015) (reaffirmed Forbes and held a plausible claim of innocence can satisfy fair-and-just reason)
Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 2015) (applied Carrasquillo; rejected bare assertions of innocence; criticized Lesko approach)
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013) (ineffective-assistance claims generally deferred to PCRA unless meritorious and apparent on the record)
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (established PCRA deferral principle for ineffectiveness claims)
Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337 (Pa. Super. 2014) (applied Lesko to impose post-sentence standard for negotiated pleas; court here declined to follow)
Commonwealth v. Lesko, 467 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983) (older case treating negotiated pleas differently; criticized and effectively overruled by later cases)
Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044 (Pa. Super. 2011) (discusses manifest injustice standard for post-sentence withdrawal)
Commonwealth v. Unangst, 71 A.3d 1017 (Pa. Super. 2013) (discretionary standard for plea-withdrawal review)
Commonwealth v. Katonka, 33 A.3d 44 (Pa. Super. 2011) (discussed limits on credibility assessments for plea-withdrawal claims)