Com. v. Washington, M.
3596 EDA 2015
Pa. Super. Ct.Sep 12, 2017Background
- Milton Washington was convicted in 1987 of first-degree murder for the 1986 killing of Tina Wyatt; conviction relied largely on four jailhouse informants who testified Appellant confessed. No physical evidence linked Washington to the crime scene.
- Autopsy showed 49 stab wounds and blunt-force trauma; biological testing at the time found semen (acid phosphatase) on the victim’s clothing and mixed/undetermined blood on items, but Appellant’s blood type (B) did not match several crime-scene samples (Type A or undetermined).
- Several informants later recanted or implicated coercion/leniency deals; defense had raised those recantations in prior post-conviction proceedings without success.
- In 2012 the parties agreed to DNA testing under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1; Cellmark testing (2013) excluded Washington as the source of the male DNA from sperm on the inside crotch of the victim’s jeans; profile did not match CODIS.
- Washington filed a timely fourth PCRA petition within 60 days of the DNA results seeking a new trial based on after-discovered DNA evidence; the PCRA court dismissed, finding the exclusion was not exculpatory because it did not show when semen was deposited and the jury already knew there was no physical link to Appellant.
- Superior Court affirmed, applying the Schlup/D’Amato framework and holding the DNA, viewed with the whole record (including witness reliability and circumstantial evidence), would not make it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DNA exclusion of Appellant from semen on victim’s jeans is exculpatory after-discovered evidence entitling to a new trial | DNA testing conclusively excludes Washington as source of sperm on jeans; exclusion is newly discovered, non-cumulative, and would likely change verdict | Exclusion does not establish innocence because it does not show time of deposition; victim’s profession makes prior contact plausible; jury already knew no physical link existed | Held: Not sufficiently exculpatory; DNA exclusion would not likely compel a different verdict when weighed against whole record |
| Whether court properly assessed DNA results in light of the whole record | DNA should be considered decisive given absence of physical evidence linking Washington and recantations undermining informant testimony | DNA must be weighed with witness credibility, circumstantial evidence, and trial record; exclusion alone is not dispositive | Held: PCRA court correctly evaluated DNA with whole record per D’Amato standard |
| Whether recantations (Kennedy, Rish) should be credited in the new-trial analysis | Recantations corroborate innocence and, combined with DNA, would probably change outcome | Recantations are unreliable: Kennedy invoked Fifth and recanted affidavit lacks weight; Rish’s statements are unsworn letters and he may be deceased | Held: Recantations not given weight; do not alter the Schlup/D’Amato analysis |
| Whether PCRA court applied correct legal standard for §9543.1 and after-discovered evidence | Court misapplied standard by treating DNA as merely corroborative and not addressing whether "more likely than not" no reasonable juror would convict | Court applied §9543.1 and after-discovered-evidence test (Schlup/D’Amato), weighing DNA against whole record and witness reliability | Held: Court applied correct legal standard and properly denied relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa. Super. 2011) (ordering DNA testing constitutes prima facie showing that favorable results could establish actual innocence)
- D'Amato, 856 A.2d 806 (Pa. 2004) (after-discovered-evidence standard and requirement to evaluate new evidence in light of the evidence as a whole)
- Padillas, 997 A.2d 356 (Pa. Super. 2010) (courts must weigh exculpatory DNA against overall strength of conviction evidence and integrity of new evidence)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1995) (actual-innocence gateway: new evidence must make it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)