Com. v. Washington, A., 2067 MDA 2015

On Dec. 28, 2014, Akeem Washington was denied entry to a Lancaster restaurant, engaged in profane/abusive conduct with companions, and resisted officers who responded.
Officers deployed a Taser and used force; Washington struggled, elbowed an officer, was arrested, taken to the station, and placed in a holding cell.
While jailed, Washington told cellmate Treymane Jones he wanted the three arresting officers (and a sergeant’s family) killed and solicited Jones’ help; Jones reported this and Washington was charged separately with solicitation to commit homicide (Crim. No. 862-2015).
Washington was convicted at a bench trial of disorderly conduct and terroristic threats (Crim. No. 152-2015) and acquitted of resisting arrest and public drunkenness; he was previously tried and convicted on solicitation charges.
Washington moved to dismiss the later charges under Pennsylvania’s compulsory-joinder statute (18 Pa.C.S. § 110), arguing the prosecutions arose from the same criminal episode; he also challenged sufficiency of evidence for terroristic threats.
The trial court denied dismissal; on appeal the Superior Court affirmed, holding (1) § 110 did not bar the prosecution because the earlier trial did not admit the restaurant/station events as substantive evidence and the offenses were not part of the same criminal episode, and (2) evidence was sufficient to support terroristic-threats conviction.

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Washington's Argument	Held
Whether § 110 compulsory-joinder bars prosecution of disorderly conduct/terroristic threats because solicitation trial occurred first	§ 110 inapplicable because prior trial did not admit the underlying arrest/restaurant conduct as substantive evidence and the offenses are not the same criminal episode	The later charges should be barred because they arose from the same criminal episode and evidence/witnesses overlapped with the earlier trial	Denial of dismissal affirmed: prior trial’s use of arrest/station facts was limited/contextual, not substantive; offenses not temporally or logically part of the same episode
Sufficiency of evidence for terroristic threats (intent to terrorize vs. transitory anger)	Evidence showed unprovoked, deliberate threats to Sergeant Berkheiser (eye contact, calm statements including "I'll f* you up" and "I'll be out in six months"), supporting intent to terrorize	Threats were spontaneous, product of transitory anger and intoxication, not a deliberate terrorizing intent	Conviction affirmed: threats were deliberate, unprovoked, calm, and supported an intent to terrorize rather than mere heated anger

Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973) (basis for Pennsylvania’s compulsory-joinder/double-jeopardy principles)
Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618 (Pa. 2010) (purpose of compulsory joinder rule to protect double-jeopardy interests when prosecutor declines earlier charges)
Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579 (Pa. 2013) (§ 110 test: prior conviction/acquittal, same conduct/episode, prosecutor knowledge, same judicial district; focus on substantial duplication of factual/legal issues)
Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177 (Pa. 1983) (same criminal episode analysis: temporal and logical relationship)
In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. 1999) (‘‘spur-of-the-moment’’ threats from heated exchanges may not constitute terroristic threats)
In re J.H., 797 A.2d 260 (Pa. Super. 2002) (calm, unprovoked threats can support terroristic-threats conviction)
Commonwealth v. Purnell, 516 A.2d 1203 (Pa. Super. 1986) (separate prosecution allowed where facts and proofs are distinct despite common genesis)
Commonwealth v. Mickel, 142 A.3d 870 (Pa. Super. 2016) (standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence)