Com. v. Vorrado, B.
19 EDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 3, 2016Background
- Vorrado assaulted and robbed Cecilia Wasko on March 20, 2012; she suffered multiple facial fractures and identified him to police. Vorrado was charged with aggravated assault, robbery, PIC, and related counts.
- Wasko missed earlier hearings, later testified at a preliminary hearing, then died of a drug overdose before trial; the trial court admitted her preliminary-hearing testimony at trial.
- Case set for trial Feb 10, 2014; after jury selection and after the court denied a motion to suppress prison phone calls, Vorrado entered an open guilty plea to aggravated assault, robbery, and PIC; Commonwealth de‑mandatorized charges to avoid mandatory 25‑year "three strikes" exposure.
- Vorrado filed pro se motions to withdraw his plea, remove counsel, and for continuance; he later withdrew the pro se motions after new counsel entered and the court bifurcated sentencing to take testimony of Officer Brown (who was soon deploying).
- After Officer Brown was deployed, defense filed a counseled pre‑sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea asserting innocence, coercion by prior counsel, and confusion about elements; the trial court denied the motion and later imposed an aggregate 13–45 year sentence.
- On appeal, Vorrado argued his timely assertions of innocence and explanations constituted a fair-and-just reason to withdraw pre‑sentence; the Superior Court affirmed, finding his claim implausible in light of timing, intercepted prison calls, and procedural gamesmanship.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Vorrado) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying pre‑sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea | Vorrado argued his timely, unconditional assertion of innocence, plus claims of coercion by counsel and confusion about elements, provided a fair-and-just reason to withdraw | Commonwealth argued withdrawal was pretextual, timed to impede prosecution (witness unavailability), and undermined by prison calls showing witness‑tampering | Court held no abuse of discretion: Vorrado’s innocence claim was implausible given timing, phone calls, and conduct; denial affirmed |
| Whether a bald claim of innocence alone requires withdrawal pre‑sentence | Vorrado relied on precedents holding innocence alone sufficient | Commonwealth relied on Supreme Court guidance requiring plausibility/colorable demonstration | Court applied Supreme Court’s Carrasquillo/Hvizda standard: innocence must be plausible or accompanied by a colorable demonstration |
| Whether Commonwealth would be substantially prejudiced by withdrawal (Forbes balancing) | Vorrado contended Commonwealth would not be prejudiced | Commonwealth emphasized loss of Officer Brown (deployed) and costs/delay; asserted prejudice from witness unavailability | Court declined to reach prejudice analysis because Vorrado failed to show a fair-and-just reason; but noted Commonwealth’s prejudice concerns were real |
| Whether defendant’s procedural history (timing, prior withdrawals, cooperation claims) warranted credibility findings | Vorrado argued timing and prior pro se motions were legitimate and prompt | Commonwealth argued timing showed tactical gamesmanship to avoid testimony and prosecution | Court credited trial court’s findings of calculated delays and gamesmanship, supporting denial |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1973) (pre‑sentence plea withdrawal governed by "fair and just reason" standard unless Commonwealth substantially prejudiced)
- Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015) (innocence claims must be plausible or accompanied by a colorable demonstration to justify pre‑sentence withdrawal)
- Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 2015) (applied Carrasquillo; bare assertions of innocence insufficient where other evidence shows pretext)
- Commonwealth v. Katonka, 33 A.3d 44 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Forbes standard; cautioned against discrediting unambiguous innocence claims without basis)
- Commonwealth v. Tennison, 969 A.2d 572 (Pa. Super. 2009) (denial appropriate where innocence claim is conditional or belied by record)
- Commonwealth v. Randolph, 718 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1998) (prior decision treating assertion of innocence as sufficient for pre‑sentence withdrawal)
- Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044 (Pa. Super. 2011) (post‑sentence withdrawal requires showing manifest injustice)
- Commonwealth v. Unangst, 71 A.3d 1017 (Pa. Super. 2013) (discretionary standard for withdrawal motions)
- Commonwealth v. Lesko, 467 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983) (discussed in Hvizda; earlier authority on standards for withdrawal)