Com. v. Velez-Diaz, L., Jr., Com. v. Velez-Diaz, L., Jr. No. 1472 MDA 2016

Defendant Luis Manuel Velez‑Diaz Jr. lived at 331 Susquehanna St.; a PFA was entered against him forbidding entry.
He was charged with and convicted by a jury of criminal trespass for entering the residence on May 12, 2014.
The criminal complaint alleged service of the PFA on May 10, 2014; the return of service form showed May 28, 2014.
Officer Jessica Higgins testified she verbally told Velez‑Diaz on May 10, 2014 that he was not permitted to return to the residence.
Velez‑Diaz was sentenced to 16 months to 5 years; his direct appeal was affirmed. He filed a PCRA petition claiming appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence challenge.
The PCRA court dismissed the petition; this appeal followed and the Superior Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was appellate counsel ineffective for not raising sufficiency of the evidence on appeal?	Commonwealth: trial evidence (including officer testimony) established notice and elements of criminal trespass.	Velez‑Diaz: PFA service date discrepancy (complaint: May 10; return: May 28) means he lacked notice on May 12, so Commonwealth failed to prove element of knowing lack of license.	Court held counsel was not ineffective because evidence (verbal notice on May 10) provided actual notice, so the sufficiency claim lacked arguable merit.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294 (Pa. 2014) (standard and scope of appellate review of PCRA denial)
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232 (Pa. 2001) (three‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Commonwealth v. Walker, 36 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2011) (failure to prove any prong defeats an ineffectiveness claim)
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 885 A.2d 994 (Pa. Super. 2005) (verbal notice that a PFA was entered can supply sufficient notice for criminal trespass)