Com. v. Vega-Diaz, L., Com. v. Vega-Diaz, L. No. 1530 MDA 2016

Luis Vega‑Diaz was convicted of multiple drug offenses after a December 7, 1995 jury trial and sentenced on February 26, 1996 to an aggregate term of 5–15 years.
This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on February 18, 1997; he did not seek discretionary review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, so the judgment became final on March 20, 1997.
He filed a timely first PCRA petition in 1997; the court denied it after an evidentiary hearing in 1999 and his appeal was dismissed in 2000 for failure to file a brief.
On March 4, 2016, Vega‑Diaz filed a second pro se PCRA petition (styled as a motion to modify sentence) invoking Alleyne v. United States to challenge the sentencing scheme.
The PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice and dismissed the petition as untimely on September 1, 2016; Vega‑Diaz appealed pro se to the Superior Court.
The Superior Court affirmed, holding the petition was facially untimely and Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether second PCRA petition invoking Alleyne is timely	Vega‑Diaz argued Alleyne renders his sentence unconstitutional and thus his petition should be considered	Commonwealth argued petition is untimely under §9545(b)(1) and Alleyne does not create a retroactive exception	The petition is untimely; Alleyne does not apply retroactively, so no jurisdiction to consider the claim
Whether illegality of sentence avoids PCRA time bar	Vega‑Diaz contended illegality of sentence permits collateral review despite time limits	Commonwealth relied on Fahy: legality claims still must meet PCRA time limits or an exception	Court held illegality claim does not circumvent PCRA timeliness requirements
Whether Alleyne is a newly recognized constitutional right that applies retroactively	Vega‑Diaz asserted Alleyne announced a right under §9545(b)(1)(iii)	Commonwealth pointed to Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent rejecting retroactive application of Alleyne	Court held Alleyne has not been held retroactive by U.S. or Pa. Supreme Court and thus does not satisfy §9545(b)(1)(iii)
Whether any other statutory exception to timeliness applies	Vega‑Diaz did not show government interference or newly discovered facts	Commonwealth maintained no §9545(b)(1)(i) or (ii) showing was pleaded or proven	Court held no statutory exception was established; dismissal affirmed

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680 (Pa. Super. 2011) (standard of review for PCRA orders)
Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. 2000) (untimely PCRA petitions deprive court of jurisdiction)
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (legality-of-sentence claims still subject to PCRA time limits)
Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d 266 (Pa. Super. 2016) (new constitutional rules apply retroactively only if higher court so holds)
Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016) (Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review)
Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Alleyne not retroactive for collateral relief)
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014) (same)
Commonwealth v. Abu‑Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2008) (burden on petitioner to plead and prove applicability of PCRA exceptions)