Com. v. Tierno, W.
974 MDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Aug 23, 2016Background
- William John Tierno pleaded guilty to multiple offenses in two dockets and was sentenced to an aggregate 12–24 years’ imprisonment on August 20, 2010.
- Tierno filed a first PCRA petition; the PCRA court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, and this Court affirmed that counsel competently advised him to accept the plea. Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied.
- On February 23, 2015, Tierno filed a second pro se PCRA petition invoking the timeliness exception based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Armstrong.
- The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice and dismissed the petition on May 18, 2015; Tierno timely appealed.
- The Commonwealth and the PCRA court concluded Tierno’s petition was untimely (final judgment became final January 30, 2012) and that Armstrong did not announce a new constitutional right nor apply retroactively to his case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Armstrong creates a §9545(b)(1)(iii) exception allowing review of Tierno’s untimely PCRA petition | Armstrong requires that sentencing as a second‑strike occur before sentencing as a third‑strike; this new authority entitles Tierno to relief | Armstrong did not announce a new constitutional right applicable retroactively; Tierno’s petition remains untimely and meritless | Denied — Armstrong is statutory construction, not a newly recognized constitutional right, and was not shown to apply retroactively |
| Whether Armstrong affects legality of Tierno’s sentence because he was allegedly sentenced as a third‑strike offender improperly | Armstrong allegedly changed the strike sequencing requirement, so Tierno’s plea should be withdrawable | Tierno was already a two‑strike offender before the instant convictions, so Armstrong does not alter his sentence legality | Denied — Armstrong does not affect Tierno’s sentence; record shows prior violent convictions making him a two‑strike offender before these convictions |
| Whether judicial decisions can qualify as "newly discovered facts" under §9545(b)(1)(ii) | Tierno implies Armstrong or later case law constitutes newly discovered grounds | Judicial decisions are not "newly discovered facts" under precedent | Denied — judicial decisions are not newly discovered facts; §9545(b)(1)(ii) inapplicable |
| Whether claim was previously litigated and precluded | Claim was timely under the Armstrong-based exception | The claim was raised and adjudicated in prior PCRA proceedings; issue precluded | Denied — claim was previously litigated and rejected; claim fails on merits and timeliness |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 107 A.3d 735 (Pa. 2014) (interpreting §9714(a)(2) mandatory minimum sequencing; did not announce a new constitutional rule)
- Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Superior Court discussion on third‑strike sentencing sequencing)
- Commonwealth v. Tierno, 81 A.3d 1005 (Pa. Super. 2013) (affirming prior PCRA denial and counsel competence regarding plea)
- Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013) (judicial decisions do not constitute newly discovered facts under §9545(b)(1)(ii))
- Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245 (Pa. 2013) (standard of review and PCRA timeliness principles)