260 A.3d 111
Pa. Super. Ct.2021Background
- Appellant Todd Tarselli pleaded guilty in 1992 to first‑degree murder and received a mandatory life sentence without parole; resentencing occurred in 1993 and the judgment became final long ago.
- Tarselli is a Korean adoptee whose recorded birthdate (Nov. 14, 1973) was assigned after he told orphanage staff he was “six” when admitted; Korean age conventions at the time often add one year at birth and add another at lunar new year.
- If his true birth year is 1974 (as he contends might be the case), he may have been under 18 on Jan. 24, 1992, when the offense occurred, potentially triggering Miller v. Alabama protections against mandatory LWOP for juveniles.
- Prior PCRA petition challenging his sentence was dismissed as untimely and that dismissal was affirmed in 2014; after Montgomery (2016) recognized Miller retroactivity, Tarselli filed a new PCRA petition in 2016 asserting he was a juvenile at the time of the crime.
- The PCRA court denied relief, concluding the record supported that he was 18 at the time; on appeal the Superior Court considered timeliness (PCRA time‑bar exception), the evidentiary showing about age, and whether exact DOB is required for Miller relief.
- The Superior Court found Tarselli’s evidence (adoption records, agency letter, expert testimony on Korean age norms, and his own testimony) made it more likely than not he was under 18 and reversed/ remanded for resentencing under Miller/Montgomery; other juvenile‑processing claims remained denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / PCRA time‑bar exception | Tarselli filed shortly after Montgomery and thus meets the §9545(b)(1)(iii) retroactivity window | Commonwealth argued Tarselli knew of birthdate issues earlier and lacked diligence for a time‑bar exception | Court held petition timely under the Montgomery retroactivity exception and that filing was prompt after Montgomery |
| Applicability of Miller/Montgomery | Miller forbids mandatory LWOP for juveniles; Montgomery made Miller retroactive, so Tarselli is entitled to relief if he was <18 | Commonwealth asserted Miller irrelevant if Tarselli was 18 at offense | Court held Miller/Montgomery applicable and available on collateral review; remanded for resentencing if juvenile status is established |
| Burden to prove age at time of offense | Tarselli: need only prove by preponderance that he was <18 when crime occurred; exact DOB not required | Commonwealth: evidence is speculative and shows recorded DOB (1973) making him 18 | Court held preponderance standard applies and exact DOB is not required; Tarselli met preponderance that Korean age norms made him likely under 18 |
| Sufficiency of cultural‑age evidence | Tarselli relied on orphanage records, agency letter, and expert on Korean age conventions to show he was effectively one year younger than recorded | Commonwealth characterized evidence as conjectural and insufficient | Court ruled the cultural‑age evidence made it more likely than not he was a juvenile and reversed/ remanded for resentencing; other claims about juvenile processing were denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review)
- Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998) (PCRA relief requires establishing a timeliness exception before reaching merits)
- In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017) (preponderance of evidence is the proper burden in PCRA proceedings)