Com. v. Stroh, B., Com. v. Stroh, B. No. 1875 WDA 2016

Background

Brian P. Stroh pleaded guilty pursuant to a binding plea on July 31, 2015 to possession with intent to deliver and criminal use of a communication facility; parties agreed to a negotiated incarceration term of 2½ years (minus one day) to 5 years (minus two days), to be served in county prison.
Stroh began serving his county sentence, received credit for time served, RRRI eligibility, and work release.
On September 19, 2016 (after ~15 months in jail), Stroh moved to serve the remainder of his incarceration on electronic monitoring/house arrest.
The trial court granted the motion on November 9, 2016 and ordered electronic monitoring; Stroh paid monitoring fees and was placed on the program.
The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration and then timely appealed, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter the sentencing order more than 30 days after entry and that electronic monitoring is not equivalent to incarceration under the plea.
The Superior Court vacated the trial court’s November 9, 2016 order as beyond the court’s jurisdiction and remanded to reinstate the original July 31, 2015 sentence.

Issues

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Stroh's Argument	Held
1) Did the trial court have jurisdiction to convert part of the jail sentence to electronic monitoring more than 30 days after sentencing?	Court lacked jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 because modification occurred well beyond 30 days and no timely post-sentence relief or appeal was filed.	The order did not "modify" the sentence because the sentence length/number remained unchanged.	Held: No jurisdiction; the November 9, 2016 order was a nullity and must be vacated.
2) If the court had jurisdiction, does electronic monitoring constitute "incarceration" required by the plea?	(Commonwealth) Electronic monitoring is not equivalent to incarceration and thus would conflict with the negotiated plea.	(Stroh) Electronic monitoring should count toward service of the sentence (implicitly).	Held: Court noted precedent (Kyle) that home electronic monitoring is generally not "incarceration," so the order would have been reversible on the merits as well.
3) If the court had jurisdiction, did the order violate the plea agreement and sentencing order?	The order altered the court-ordered terms of a binding negotiated plea specifying county incarceration.	The trial court could allow home monitoring without changing the sentence term.	Held: Because the order modified the court-ordered place/means of service, it conflicted with the binding plea and could not stand.
4) (Related equitable argument) Are there equitable exceptions that would entitle Stroh to credit or to keep time on monitoring?	Commonwealth: No applicable equitable basis here to change the sentence.	Stroh: Alleged reliance and practical unfairness—he paid fees and relied on placement.	Held: Court noted limited equitable exceptions (e.g., Kriston) but found none applicable to override the binding negotiated plea; acknowledged Stroh’s loss but vacated the order nonetheless.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219 (Pa. 2013) (trial court lacked power to alter sentence beyond statutory 30‑day window)
Commonwealth v. Kyle, 874 A.2d 12 (Pa. 2005) (electronic home monitoring generally is not "incarceration" for credit purposes; exceptions may exist in equity)
Commonwealth v. Kriston, 588 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1991) (equitable exception permitting credit where release to home confinement resulted from prison authorities’ actions without sentencing court’s knowledge)
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 643 A.2d 109 (Pa. Super. 1994) (binding negotiated plea limits trial court and parties to the agreed terms)
Borough of Media v. County of Delaware, 82 A.3d 509 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (statutory time limit under § 5505 is jurisdictional and non-waivable)