Com. v. Steckley, S., Jr.
128 A.3d 826
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- Steckley was charged with two counts of possession of child pornography and one count of prohibited offensive weapons; pretrial guideline worksheets (provided by the Commonwealth) showed a much lower sentencing range and did not indicate a 25‑year mandatory minimum under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.2.
- On the day jury selection began counsel engaged in plea negotiations; the Commonwealth offered an aggregate recommendation of 3–6 years, later 2–6 years; Steckley rejected the offers based on the guideline worksheets.
- Steckley was convicted by a jury of two counts of possession of child pornography; eight days before sentencing the Commonwealth gave post‑trial notice it would seek a 25‑year mandatory minimum due to a 1994 indecent assault conviction.
- At sentencing the court imposed concurrent 25–50 year terms. Steckley filed a PCRA petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the risk of a 25‑year mandatory sentence.
- The PCRA court granted relief, vacated convictions, and ordered a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed; the Superior Court affirmed ineffective assistance (prejudice) but reversed the remedy of a new trial and remanded for resentencing consistent with the originally offered plea (i.e., require the prosecution to reoffer the plea or otherwise effectuate Lafler relief).
Issues
| Issue | Steckley (petitioner) argument | Commonwealth (respondent) argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Steckley proved prejudice from counsel’s failure to inform him of the mandatory minimum (Pierce/Strickland prejudice prong) | Counsel’s omission caused Steckley to reject a favorable plea he would have accepted; he and counsel credibly testified he would have pled guilty to the 2–6 year recommendation | Steckley’s testimony is self‑serving and inconsistent with his insistence on innocence; prosecutor may not have offered the plea if it had known about the mandatory minimum | Court held Steckley met Lafler/Pierce prejudice: testimony credible, corroborated by counsel and sentencing disparity; reasonable probability he would have accepted plea and court would have imposed less severe sentence than 25–50 years |
| Whether the proper remedy is vacatur and a new trial | Steckley sought a new trial as relief | Commonwealth argued new trial was the remedy granted below; it contended vacatur/new trial was permissible | Court held a new trial was not the appropriate remedy under Lafler; instead the remedy must neutralize the harm by restoring the plea opportunity—remand for resentencing consistent with the plea offer (i.e., require prosecution to reoffer the plea) |
| Whether the district attorney’s knowledge or conduct affects prejudice showing | Not required; counsel had a Sixth Amendment duty to advise client of sentencing exposure | Prosecutor’s lack of knowledge might mean the plea would not have been offered or would have been withdrawn | Court held the relevant inquiry is whether it’s reasonably probable the offer would have remained available until acceptance; speculation permitted under Lafler and here timeline supported reasonable probability the offer would have persisted |
| Whether trial court would have accepted the plea recommendation | The plea was non‑binding recommendation (2–6 years), court had no reason to reject it | Trial court later stated it would have imposed the same sentence even absent the mandatory minimum | Court held it was reasonably probable the court would have accepted or imposed a less severe sentence under the plea terms; the sentence imposed after trial was illegal absent § 9718.2, so the court’s post‑hoc statement did not defeat prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (prejudice framework where ineffective assistance causes rejection of plea: reasonable probability the plea would have been accepted, the court would have accepted it, and the resulting sentence would have been less severe)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (right to effective assistance during plea negotiations)
- Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 2009) (adopting three‑part Pierce formulation of Strickland in Pennsylvania)
- Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987) (establishing Pennsylvania’s three‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080 (Pa.Super. 2014) (standard of review for PCRA appeals)