Com. v. St. Vincent, J., Com. v. St. Vincent, J. No. 2012 WDA 2015

John P. St. Vincent pleaded guilty on March 13, 2013 to two counts of robbery and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 7 to 14 years imprisonment plus five years probation.
He did not file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal. On June 26, 2013 he filed a PCRA petition claiming the trial court failed to state RRRI (recidivism risk reduction incentive) eligibility on the record.
The Commonwealth agreed resentencing was necessary to address RRRI eligibility; on May 28, 2014 the trial court resentenced St. Vincent and explicitly found him not RRRI-eligible, reimposing the original sentence.
On February 26, 2015 St. Vincent filed a second, pro se PCRA petition alleging trial counsel coerced his plea and appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising coercion; he did not plead any statutory timeliness exception.
The PCRA court treated the filing as a second PCRA petition, issued a Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss as untimely, and dismissed the petition on November 29, 2015; St. Vincent appealed.
The Superior Court affirmed, holding the second petition was untimely because the first PCRA remedy (resentencing limited to RRRI finding) did not reset the judgment-finality clock.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the second PCRA petition is timely	St. Vincent argued his ineffective-assistance claims warranted relief (filed Feb 26, 2015)	Commonwealth argued petition was untimely because judgment became final Apr 12, 2013 and no exception was pled	Petition is untimely; St. Vincent failed to plead an exception, so court lacked jurisdiction
Whether the earlier PCRA relief reset the one-year filing deadline	St. Vincent implicitly argued resentencing created a new finality date	Commonwealth contended the first PCRA only affected sentence (RRRI finding) and did not restore appeal rights or disturb conviction	Court held the first PCRA did not reset the finality clock; McKeever/DeHart control
Whether a Rule 907 dismissal was proper without a hearing	St. Vincent filed no meaningful response to the Rule 907 notice	Commonwealth maintained dismissal was appropriate given untimeliness and lack of pleaded exception	Dismissal under Rule 907 was proper because petition was time-barred and no exception was claimed
Whether the court should consider the merits despite timeliness	St. Vincent sought relief on counsel-ineffectiveness claims	Commonwealth argued courts lack jurisdiction to reach merits of untimely petitions	Court declined to reach merits; jurisdictional time-bar precluded relief

Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 2008) (successful first PCRA that affects only sentence does not restart PCRA timeliness clock)
Commonwealth v. DeHart, 730 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. 1999) (same principle: sentence-only relief does not reset finality)
Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2003) (PCRA timeliness is jurisdictional; courts must address timeliness first)
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1999) (courts must determine timeliness before considering claims)
Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000) (PCRA timing requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional)
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (failure to meet PCRA time requirements deprives court of jurisdiction)
Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2011) (PCRA relief is confined to parts of a judgment disturbed by prior proceedings)
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (untimely PCRA petitions cannot be entertained)
Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2008) (burden on petitioner to plead and prove applicability of statutory timeliness exceptions)