Com. v. Spencer, V., Com. v. Spencer v. No. 446 EDA 2016

Vincent D. Spencer was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, robbery, burglary, and possessing an instrument of crime for a 1986 killing; sentenced to life imprisonment and direct appeals were denied.
Spencer filed multiple PCRA petitions; his fourth PCRA petition was filed pro se on August 13, 2012 and dismissed by the PCRA court as untimely on January 15, 2016.
Spencer was 31 years old at the time of the offense; he argued his sentence should be invalid under Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana.
Spencer also argued ineffective assistance of counsel by trial, direct-appeal, and prior PCRA counsel, and sought to invoke McQuiggin and Martinez to overcome timeliness.
The PCRA court dismissed the petition under the PCRA one-year time bar; the dismissal occurred ten days before Montgomery was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Superior Court reviewed whether any statutory timeliness exception applied and whether federal decisions (McQuiggin, Martinez) created an equitable escape from the PCRA time bar.

Issue	Spencer's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether Miller/Montgomery entitle Spencer to relief despite untimely PCRA	Miller/Montgomery should apply to him because he has a mental age under 18 and Montgomery makes Miller retroactive	Miller/Montgomery apply only to offenders under 18 at the time of the offense; Spencer was 31	Denied — Miller/Montgomery do not apply because Spencer was an adult when offense occurred
Whether Spencer met the §9545(b)(1)(iii) newly recognized-right exception	His claim invokes a new constitutional rule (Miller) that was later held retroactive (Montgomery)	Exception only helps those who were juveniles at the time of the crime	Denied — exception inapplicable because Spencer was not a juvenile
Whether McQuiggin or Martinez permit equitable relief from PCRA time bar	McQuiggin (actual innocence) and Martinez (post-conviction counsel default) should allow review	Federal habeas doctrine does not create additional exceptions to Pennsylvania’s statutory PCRA timeliness rules	Denied — Pennsylvania courts decline to expand PCRA exceptions based on those federal cases
Whether counsel ineffectiveness claims should be considered despite untimeliness	Ineffective assistance of prior counsel excuses untimeliness or merits review	Timeliness is jurisdictional; petitioner must satisfy a statutory exception before merits consideration	Denied — PCRA court correctly dismissed on timeliness; ineffectiveness not reached

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (held mandatory LWOP unconstitutional for offenders under 18)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (held Miller applies retroactively on collateral review)
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (actual innocence can overcome federal habeas statute of limitations)
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (limited federal exception for ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-counsel in federal habeas)
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2016) (Pennsylvania rejected creating equitable exceptions to PCRA timeliness based on federal habeas precedents)
Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016) (Miller does not apply to adult offenders despite claimed low "mental age")