Com. v. Shields, D.
2004 WDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Dec 20, 2016Background
- In 2008 Donnell Shields lured a 13‑year‑old into a maintenance room and sexually assaulted her; he pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, and corruption of minors. He was sentenced to 2–5 years and did not appeal.
- At the time of the plea, indecent assault carried a 10‑year registration period; statutory sexual assault was not then registerable under Megan’s Law II.
- In 2012 the legislature enacted SORNA, expanding registration: indecent assault to 25 years and making statutory sexual assault registerable (Tier III, lifetime in many circumstances).
- In 2015 Shields moved to enforce his plea agreement, arguing SORNA’s retroactive registration obligations breached the plea contract and violated due process and the ex post facto clauses.
- The trial court denied the motion; the Superior Court affirmed, finding no record evidence that registration (or non‑registration) was a term of Shields’ plea and concluding SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive for ex post facto purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Shields) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retroactive SORNA registration breached the plea agreement | Plea is a contract; collateral consequences in force at pleading are implied terms, so later expansion of registration unilaterally alters the bargain | No evidence registration was a term of the plea; plea colloquy and written record silent on registration | Denied — no breach: registration was not a bargained term and post‑plea statutory changes apply |
| Whether retroactive application of SORNA violates due process | Retroactive application is fundamentally unfair; violates due process | Statute applies as written; Shields provided no authority on due process claim (waived) | Waived — Shields failed to develop the due process argument |
| Whether SORNA’s retroactive registration violates ex post facto clauses | Retroactive enlargement of registration period and new lifetime obligation is punitive and thus unconstitutional as ex post facto | SORNA is a civil regulatory scheme; under Smith v. Doe and Mendoza‑Martinez factors its effects are not punitive | Denied — court concludes SORNA is non‑punitive in purpose and not sufficiently punitive in effect to trigger ex post facto protection |
| Whether amendments to registration duration can be applied to pre‑plea or pre‑SORNA convictions generally | (Overlap with above) Argues unilateral modification of plea contract not permitted; requires explicit negotiation or notice | Prior Superior Court precedent allows post‑plea amendments to registration duration where registration was not an express term | Denied — precedent (e.g., Benner) permits application of amended registration durations when plea record is silent |
Key Cases Cited
- Hainesworth v. Commonwealth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (plea bargain enforced to protect an explicit non‑registration term when placed on the record)
- Benner v. Commonwealth, 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super. 2004) (post‑sentence amendment increasing registration period applied where plea/sentencing record was silent)
- Perez v. Commonwealth, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014) (SORNA upheld under ex post facto analysis following Smith v. Doe framework)
- Woodruff v. Commonwealth, 135 A.3d 1045 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quarterly in‑person reporting under SORNA is analogous to reporting under probation for Mendoza‑Martinez historical‑punishment factor)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (two‑step test for determining whether sex‑offender registration is punitive for ex post facto purposes)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (U.S. 1963) (multi‑factor test for determining whether a civil sanction is punitive in effect)