Com. v. Serrano, P., 1080 EDA 2017

Background

In 2007 Paul Serrano (17 at the time of the killing; arrested/charged as an adult) pled guilty to first‑degree murder and waived direct appeal in exchange for the Commonwealth’s agreement not to seek death (Roper had already made juvenile death sentences unconstitutional); he was sentenced to life without parole.
Serrano filed a pro se PCRA petition in April 2009 asserting ineffective assistance for plea counsel (failure to advise re: Roper) and requested counsel; the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely without appointing counsel or holding a hearing.
The PCRA one‑year timeliness rule applies from the date the judgment became final; Serrano’s judgment became final September 13, 2007, so a timely PCRA would have been due by September 15, 2008; his 2009 filing was untimely and alleged no exception.
In 2016 Serrano filed a counseled PCRA petition invoking Miller and Montgomery (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional and retroactivity), and later amended to seek voiding his original guilty plea for being unknowing; neither the 2016 petition nor the amendment pleaded a timeliness exception.
The Commonwealth conceded the original plea was unknowing; the PCRA court permitted withdrawal of the plea, Serrano was tried, and on February 21, 2017 he pled guilty again to first‑degree murder and received 35 years to life. Serrano appealed.
The Superior Court concluded the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Serrano’s untimely petitions (no pleaded timeliness exception), so the order withdrawing the original plea was void; the subsequent proceedings and this appeal were quashed as nullities.

Issues

Issue	Serrano's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether PCRA court properly voided Serrano’s original guilty plea	Original plea was unknowing; PCRA relief appropriate to withdraw plea	PCRA court lacked jurisdiction because PCRA petitions were facially untimely and no timeliness exception was pleaded	PCRA court lacked jurisdiction; order void; withdrawal and later proceedings were nullities
Whether Serrano’s 2016 PCRA claims (Miller/Montgomery) conferred jurisdiction	Miller/Montgomery render LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile and apply retroactively, justifying collateral relief	Timeliness rules still apply; petitioner must plead a statutory timeliness exception to invoke PCRA jurisdiction	Miller/Montgomery do not bypass PCRA timeliness requirement; exceptions must be pleaded/proven before court may act
Whether Serrano was entitled to counsel on his first PCRA petition	Denial of counsel prejudiced ability to develop exceptions to timeliness	Procedural failure acknowledged but does not cure the facial untimeliness in subsequent petitions without exceptions pleaded	Denial of counsel was error, but PCRA court still lacked jurisdiction absent pleaded exceptions
Whether appeal from post‑withdrawal judgment is proper	Serrano sought review of new sentence and claim that maximum exposure was lower	Commonwealth argues underlying withdrawal was void, so original judgment remains effective; appeal is from no valid judgment	Appeal quashed because there was no valid judgment from which to appeal (withdrawal void)

Key Cases Cited

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile death penalty unconstitutional)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rule applies retroactively on collateral review)
Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489 (Pa. 2004) (PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional)
Commonwealth v. Smith, 818 A.2d 494 (Pa. 2003) (right to appointed counsel to develop potential PCRA exceptions)
Commonwealth v. Morris, 771 A.2d 721 (Pa. 2001) (a court without jurisdiction cannot issue valid orders)
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 496 A.2d 1156 (Pa. Super. 1985) (proceedings based on non‑existent judgment are nullities)